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Abstract	
	 This	senior	thesis	is	an	in	depth	analysis	of	the	historical	causes	of	the	Syrian	civil	
war.	I	argue	that	the	main	components	leading	to	the	civil	war	under	Bashar	al-Asad	were	
as	follows;	Sectarian	division,	French	intervention	and	mandates,	Israeli	&	Syrian	conflict,	
Egypt	&	Syrian	Union,	and	Hafiz	al-Asad’s	rise	to	power.	My	research	and	analysis	provided	
demonstrates	that	these	previously	mentioned	historical	stimuli	have	all	amalgamated	
leading	to	the	instability	under	Bashar	al-Asad	and	ultimately	the	modern	civil	war	we	see	
today.	The	paper	will	also	analyze	the	consequences	of	this	instability	seen	in	government	
and	society,	the	source	of	the	brutal	civil	war.	These	consequences	include	a	look	at	
Lebanon	as	a	case	study,	the	economy	both	domestically	in	Syria	and	internationally,	
demographic	changes,	and	a	focus	on	refugee	movements	seen	today.	It	concludes	with	the	
establishment	that	the	civil	war	is	the	result	of	not	just	one	individual	event,	as	is	often	
argued	internationally,	but	rather	a	conglomerate	of	deeply	intertwined	historical	
moments.	
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I. OPENING	
The	Middle	East	often	brings	to	one’s	mind	thoughts	of	turmoil,	instability,	strife,	and	
overall	chaos.	A	region	of	the	world	plagued	by	civil	and	international	wars,	it	has	
experienced	increased	dissention	among	citizens,	failing	governments,	and	growth	in	
terrorist	strongholds.	What	was	once	seen	as	a	problem	for	a	few,	has	grown	to	be	a	
problem	for	many.	Many	outside	forces,	including	the	United	States,	felt	intervention	could	
aid	and	alleviate	the	situation.	Intervention	in	the	Middle	East	though,	has	now	come	at	a	
hefty	price.	With	the	United	States,	and	many	other	effected	countries,	facing	domestic	
debate	concerning	the	issues	at	hand	in	the	Middle	East	and	how	to	proceed,	they	are	too	
far	in	to	leave	but	are	constantly	risking	the	lives	of	their	own	people.	Many	argue	the	
United	States	should	have	never	invaded	Iraq	in	2003,	and	that	this	was	the	start	of	
international	players	meddling	with	foreign	affairs	in	this	region.	While	this	can	be	debated	
for	years	to	come,	one	thing	is	much	more	clear.	Not	only	with	the	United	States,	but	all	
international	powers	who	play	a	prominent	role	in	international	relations,	the	lack	of	
understanding	the	deeply	rooted	history	of	these	countries	is	where	they	have	gone	direly	
wrong.	I	aim	with	this	paper	to	prove	that	international	belief	in	one	specified	event	as	the	
cause	of	the	civil	war	does	not	bring	us	closer	to	a	solution	for	Syria.	
To	even	begin	to	make	a	positive	change	and	democratize	a	region	of	the	world	so	
different	from	western	culture,	one	must	analyze	where	it	has	been	and	how	it	got	to	where	
it	currently	is.	The	Middle	East	is	complexly	intertwined,	with	vehemently	devoted	persons	
of	both	religion	and	ethnicity.	The	historical	events	between	these	multitudes	of	various	
sects,	dates	significantly	farther	back	than	most	other	countries’	existence,	especially	the	
United	States,	the	fundamental	outside	component	we	see	today.	While	each	country	has	a	
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different	story	to	tell,	it	is	Syria	that	has	stolen	the	modern	spotlight	and	debate	floor.	Syria,	
a	country	many	felt	to	be	stable	and	secure	under	the	Asad	Regime	has	come	toppling	
down	in	the	past	five	years	by	a	raging	civil	war.	This	civil	war,	full	of	violent	acts	against	
humanity	and	civil	rights,	has	led	to	a	mass	exodus	of	Syrian	peoples.	Seeking	refuge	
wherever	will	accept	them;	the	refugee	crisis	has	become	a	new	focal	point	for	political	
debate	concerning	the	Middle	East.	Terrorist	groups	have	seen	the	Syrian	civil	war	and	
resulting	refugee	movements	as	an	opportunity	to	impose	harm	on	their	target	countries	
through	infiltration	into	different	countries	posed	as	a	refugee.	Of	course	there	are	many	
terrible	side	effects	of	the	Syrian	civil	war,	however	this	paper	will	focus	on	the	most	tragic	
consequence;	refugee	movements.	To	understand	how	Syria	has	arrived	at	this	cataclysmic	
point,	one	must	first	analyze	and	understand	the	history	of	the	country.	The	historical	
events	that	will	be	analyzed	include	the	sectarian	divides,	French	imperialism	and	
mandates,	the	Israeli	&	Syrian	conflict,	the	union	between	Egypt	&	Syria,	Hafiz	al-Asad’s	
rise	to	power,	and	the	current	rule	of	Bashar	al-Asad.	This	paper	will	analyze	the	history	of	
the	Syrian	civil	war	in	a	way	that	supports	a	multifaceted	view	of	its	historical	causes.	It	
will	also	examine	the	modern	tragic	consequences	broadly	that	we	are	experiencing	today,	
and	then	specifically	the	resulting	refugee	movement.	It	concludes	with	the	establishment	
that	the	civil	war	is	the	result	of	not	just	one	individual	event,	as	is	often	argued	
internationally,	but	rather	a	conglomerate	of	deeply	intertwined	historical	moments.	
	
II.	HISTORY	
There	must	be	an	understanding	of	the	main	historical	moments	that	have	
contributed	to	the	Syrian	failure.	As	Syrian	expert	Josef	Olmert	stated,	“its	fundamental	
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causes,	as	well	as	its	course	and	possible	implications	are	uniquely	bound	with	the	political	
development	of	the	Syrian	state	from	its	very	inception”	(SPME).	Understanding	Syria	
begins	with	an	analysis	of	how	The	Middle	East	even	came	into	existence.	Before	it	was,	as	
it	is	today,	modernly	known	as	“The	Middle	East”,	it	was	historically	referred	to	as	“the	
Near	East”.	The	extensive	historical	background	of	such	a	region	is	what	plays	such	a	
deeply	prominent	role	in	where	it	is	at	today.	No	other	region	or	country	has	the	depth	of	
history	quite	like	the	Middle	East;	after	all,	one	author	describes	it	as	“the	most	ancient	
region	of	human	civilization”	(Mansfield).	To	understand	the	causes	of	the	modern	civil	war	
in	Syria,	including	the	French	rule	and	mandate,	the	war	with	Israel,	the	various	sects	and	
ethnic	groups,	the	Ba’ath	party,	and	the	Assad	Regime,	one	must	first	understand	how	they	
all	came	about.	With	that,	let	us	start	from	the	beginning.		
	 Syria	today	is	marked	by	its	diverse	ethnic	and	religious	groups.	Having	such	a	
variety	of	peoples,	with	the	smallest	differences,	plays	not	only	into	its	rich	culture,	but	its	
undertone	for	violence.	Even	from	the	start	Syria	was	recognized	as	an	eccentric	
population	having	a	mixture	of	peoples	and	culture.	One	of	the	first	recognized	groups	to	
dominate	Syria	for	a	thousand	years	from	3500	B.C.	were	the	non-Semitic	and	highly	
civilized	Sumerians	from	Mesopotamia	(Mansfield).	Then	came	the	Semitic	Amorites,	
nomads	from	central	Arabia,	who	defeated	the	Sumerians.	After	that,	the	Babylonians	in	the	
middle	of	the	third	millennium	who	were	followed	by	the	Egyptians.	The	Egyptians	
however,	were	driven	out	throughout	history	by	different	invaders	including	the	Hittites’	
who	completely	conquered	all	of	Syria	in	1450	B.C.	(Mansfield).	As	these	groups	began	to	
settle	and	make	Syria	and	Palestine	their	home,	they	became	known	as	a	collective	whole	
called	the	Canaanites	in	1600	B.C.	This	group	was	unique	because	although	they	were	
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known	by	one	name,	they	were	made	up	of	many	different	people	from	many	different	
places.	Next,	in	1200	B.C.	the	Armaeans	gained	control	of	Damascus.	As	time	passed	on,	
control	of	Syria	changed	hands	often.	Through	it	all	though,	the	Canaanites	avoided	
violence	and	battle	by	getting	along	with	their	conquerors	and	making	civilization	between	
the	two	possible.		
	 As	Alexander	the	Great	came	to	The	Middle	East	and	began	conquering	cities	and	
states,	Syria	fell	into	the	hands	of	Seleucus.	Seleucus	was	a	Persian	ruler	and	friend	of	
Alexander’s,	whom	eventually	founded	the	capital	city	of	Syria,	Antioch.	As	Rome	became	a	
dominant	force	in	the	Middle	East,	Greek	rivals	Seleucid	and	Ptolemaic	sent	Syria	into	a	
decline.	This	decline	was	played	out	through	the	local	powers	in	Syria	who	saw	the	battle	
and	weakness	as	a	chance	to	assert	themselves	and	claim	what	they	wanted.	This	created	
more	tension	and	hostile	feelings	than	were	already	once	present.	Eventually,	from	29	B.C.	
to	A.D.	14	the	entire	Middle	East	region	was	incorporated	into	the	Roman	Empire.	From	
this	point	on	for	a	while,	Syria	and	several	other	countries	experienced	peace	and	order	
through	Roman	law.	The	Romans	were	a	rather	fair	conqueror	with	much	of	Syria,	allowing	
locations	to	remain	autonomous	so	long	as	they	didn’t	threaten	any	sort	of	instability	in	the	
Roman	rule.	As	we	will	later	see	amongst	the	minorities	and	Sunni	in	Syria,	even	
historically	the	urban	population	was	more	educated	and	part	of	the	intellectual	elite,	while	
the	rural	population	tended	to	be	those	of	the	lower	socioeconomic	classes	constituting	
peasants	and	tribesman.		
	 Later	controlled	by	the	Byzantines,	a	small	group	of	Islamic	faith	followers	set	their	
sites	on	regaining	Syria	and	Egypt,	which	they	succeeded	by	unifying	through	their	
resentment	towards	imperial	powers.	Upon	conquering	Syria,	the	death	of	the	prophet,	and	
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the	assassination	of	the	Caliph	successor,	the	first	cousin	of	the	Prophet	was	to	be	the	
successor.	However,	Ali	was	defeated	by	the	Umayyads,	which	led	to	the	first	and	only	
great	division	in	Islam:	between	the	Sunnis,	or	‘people	of	the	sunnah’,	who	are	the	great	
majority,	and	the	Shia	or	‘partisans’	of	Ali	(Mansfield).	This	has	had	a	major	affect	on	the	
modern	region	we	see	today	as	each	country	is	dominated	or	has	a	majority	group	of	
typically	either	Sunni	or	Shiite	causing	great	dissention	and	turmoil.		
	 Syria	from	the	beginning	has	had	a	civilization	marked	by	numerous	changes	of	
power.	The	instant	a	weakness	is	shown	by	the	group	or	person	in	charge,	or	the	moment	
more	than	one	group	find	synonymous	ground	to	go	up	against	the	authority,	is	when	a	
change	in	power	and	confrontation	occurs.	As	hostile	feelings	towards	imperial	outside	
forces	became	a	unifying	force	against	the	Byzantine	people,	it	would	also	become	a	factor	
in	Syrian	interaction	with	the	French.	As	the	collapse	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	came	to	the	
forefront,	Britain	and	France	took	it	upon	themselves	to	do	what	they	wanted	in	the	Middle	
East.	
	
III.	SECTARIAN	DIVISIONS	
Understanding	Syrian	history	should	be	like	building	blocks.	To	begin,	there	must	be	
an	understanding	of	the	various	religious	and	ethnic	groups	that	have	emerged	over	the	
years.	This	is	a	key	factor	to	basic	understanding	because,	“despite	a	great	measure	of	
cultural	uniformity,	Syria’s	present	population	is	characterized	by	strong	religious	and	
ethnic	diversity”	(Van	Dam).	Some	of	this	diversity	stems	from	the	religious	minorities,	
which	are	the	Alawis	(11.5%),	Druzes	(3.0%),	Isma’ilis	(1.5%),	and	the	Greek	Orthodox	
Christians	(4.7%),	who	constitute	the	most	important	community	of	all	Christians	in	Syria	
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(14.1%)	(Van	Dam).	The	other	side	of	diversity	stems	from	the	ethnic	branch	of	minorities.	
These	principle	minorities	are	the	Kurds	(8.5%),	Armenians	(4.0%),	Turcomans	(3.0%),	
and	Circassians	(Van	Dam).	A	portion	of	the	minorities	belong	to	the	Sunni	Muslim	
population,	allowing	them	to	identify	to	some	extent	with	a	majority	of	the	population	
while	others	find	themselves	falling	in	the	minority	category	in	both	religion	and	ethnicity.	
It	is	thus	evident	that	Syria	is	filled	with	an	array	of	religious	and	ethnic	variations	
contributing	to	their	diversity,	and	their	turmoil.	Author	Nikolaos	Van	Dam,	a	specialist	on	
Syria,	attributes	the	existence	of	so	many	religious	and	ethnic	groups	in	Syria	to	seven	main	
factors.	The	first	factor	is,	“The	three	major	monotheistic	religions,	Judaism,	Christianity	
and	Islam,	all	have	their	origins	in	the	wider	region	of	which	Syria	is	part.	The	Formation	of	
sects	and	different	schools	within	these	religions	led	to	a	great	diversity	of	faiths”	(Van	
Dam).	In	other	words,	the	Middle	East	is	the	source	of	the	three	main	umbrella	religions:	
Judaism,	Christianity,	and	Islam.	The	smaller	branches	of	each	of	these	religious	groups	that	
have	formed	over	the	years	of	history,	each	have	diverted	from	the	main	train	of	thought	in	
their	own	right.	With	slight	variations	in	beliefs	and	worship,	the	factions	have	created	an	
assortment	of	new	religious	faiths	and	practices	all	at	play	around	the	world,	and	more	
importantly	in	Syria.		
The	second	influential	factor	that	Van	Dam	points	out	is,	“The	Fertile	Crescent,	of	
which	Syria	is	part,	has	in	the	past	regularly	been	exposed	to	conquest	by	various	
population	groups,	such	as	the	Arabs,	Kurds,	Mongols	and	Turks,	and	has	always	been	a	
centre	of	tribal	and	individual	movement”	(Van	Dam).	The	Fertile	Crescent	is	a	name	given	
to	a	crescent	shaped	area	of	the	Middle	East	region	that	was	made	up	of	Iraq,	Syria,	
Lebanon,	Jordan,	Israel,	and	northern	Egypt.	This	same	region	has	also	been	nicknamed	
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“The	Cradle	of	Civilization”.	This	region	can	be	deemed	an	area	typical	of	conquest	due	to	
its	prime	conditions	for	agricultural	prosperity	including	the	fertility	of	the	land.	An	
example	of	historical	evidence	proving	the	attempt	to	conquer	this	area	by	different	
population	groups	is	seen	during	the	time	of	the	Ottoman	rule	from	1708-1758,	when	“the	
province	of	Damascus	was	caught	in	a	vise	between	displaced	Arab,	Turkman,	and	Kurdish	
tribes	as	well	as	the	great	movement	of	Arab	tribes	from	the	south,	all	threatening	the	
whole	of	the	Fertile	Crescent”	(Barbir).		
The	third	factor	is	that,	“At	times	the	Middle	East	has	been	a	place	of	refuge	for	
people	who	were	persecuted	in	surrounding	regions	on	political	or	religious	grounds.	
Groups	of	these	refugees	were	able	to	settle	in	Syria	or	its	surroundings”	(Van	Dam).	The	
next	factor	was,	“Tribal	and	national	differences	caused	by	all	these	developments	often	
took	on	a	religious	aspect	and	contributed	to	the	rise	of	different	religious	communities.	It	
is	only	natural	that	political	and	religious	diversities	developed	simultaneously	as	part	of	
this	process”	(Van	Dam).	The	rise	of	different	religious	communities	was	the	source	of	the	
now	pluralistic	culture	and	society	apparent	in	Syria.	Religious	pluralism	is	often	defined	as	
the	diversity	of	religious	belief	systems	co-existing	in	society.	Religious	affiliations	are	
strong	in	the	sense	that	people	choose	based	on	which	truths	they	believe	to	be	correct.	In	
this	thought	process	it	leaves	no	room	for	acceptance	of	truly	varying	opinions.	Religious	
sects	offer	their	own	exclusive	claims,	so	to	speak.	As	the	Syrian	society	became	a	
conglomerate	of	persecuted	people	from	outside	their	borders,	this	cultivated	the	rise	of	
differing	opinions,	which	ultimately	crossed	over	into	the	political	realm.	The	fifth	factor	
was	that,	“Religious,	tribal	and	linguistic	differences	have	frequently	been	preserved	and	
strengthened	as	a	result	of	localism,	an	intense	local	loyalty	which	in	certain	regions	was	
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fostered	by	the	geographical	structure.	This	was	particularly	true	of	the	mountains	and	
valleys	of	the	Latakia	region,	and	of	the	Jabal	al-Duruz,	with	its	difficult	access”	(Van	Dam).		
The	next	factor	was	the	role	of	deficient	communications	in	areas	of	difficult	access	
and	the	lack	of	a	strong	central	authority	which	have	both	helped	to	preserve	the	
distinctive	character	and	independence	of	religious	and	national	groups	(Van	Dam).	In	
other	words	if	a	specific	group	wished	to	remain	out	of	state	and	government	control	they	
were	able	to	secure	seclusion	in	order	to	be	undisturbed.	As	a	result,	the	areas	that	the	
government	did	and	could	extend	control	over	tended	to	be	inhabited	by	the	dominant	
religious	and	national	groups.	In	the	case	of	Syria,	this	was	the	Sunni	Arabs.	In	their	best	
effort	to	avoid	subjection	the	minorities,	Alawis,	Druzes,	and	Isma’ilis,	historic	decision	to	
seclude	themselves,	has	since	left	their	population’s	fate	sealed	in	the	less	accessible	
regions.	The	final	factor	is	that,	“religious	and	ethnic	diversities	were	also	encouraged	by	
the	toleration	shown	by	Islam	towards	Christians	and	Jews	as	well	as	the	formal	equality	of	
national	groups	inside	Islam.	Ultimately,	far	reaching	assimilation	took	place”	(Van	Dam).	
In	conclusion,	not	only	were	differing	religious	and	ethnic	minority	groups	spreading	like	
wildfire	in	Syria,	they	were	spreading	in	a	society	that	was	doing	nothing	to	stop	it	at	the	
time.	This	partial	acceptance,	or	toleration,	can	be	attributed	to	the	lack	of	emphasis	on	
nationalism	at	the	time,	which	would	later	grow	exponentially	causing	great	rifts	among	
the	growing	diversity.		
	 The	Alawis,	Druzes,	and	Isma’ilis,	which	all	make	up	the	“compact	religious	
minorities”	must	be	discussed	based	on	their	strong	political	role	in	Syrian	history.	As	was	
mentioned	previously,	many	of	the	minority	ethnic	and	religious	groups	sought	out	
seclusion	to	abstain	from	the	rule	of	law	of	the	government.	This	caused	the	Alawis	to	find	
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themselves	particularly	concentrated	in	the	Latakia	region	where	they	constitute	a	local	
majority	of	about	75%	of	all	Syrian	Alawis	(Van	Dam).	While	making	up	a	majority	in	
Latakia’s	rural	population	they	constituted	a	minority	in	the	urban	coastal	cities.	As	a	
result,	rural-urban	and	class	contrasts	more	often	than	not	coincided	with	sectarian	
differences	(Van	Dam).	Furthermore	the	urban	population,	primarily	made	up	of	Sunnis,	
became	increasingly	dominant	and	controlling	over	the	rural	population,	primarily	made	
up	of	Alawis.	Beaten	down	and	poverty-stricken,	distrust	and	anger	towards	Sunnis	by	the	
Alawis	grew	strong.		
	 The	Alawis	are	typically	subdivided	into	four	main	confederations.	These	
confederations	are	their	tribal	affiliations.	The	four	main	confederations	are:	the	
Khayyatun,	Haddadun,	Matawirah	and	Kalbiya	(Van	Dam).	Perpetuating	the	deeply	diverse	
culture	of	Syria,	“of	the	four	Alawi	tribal	confederations	two	important	religious	groups	
have	split	off;	the	Haydariyun	and	the	Ghasasinah”	(Van	Dam).	The	Haydariyun	who	have	
their	own	religious	differentiating	unity	continued	to	uphold	their	tribal	ties.	The	
Ghasasinah	came	to	the	forefront	following	the	First	World	War	under	the	leadership	of	
Sulayman	al-Murhsid.	Upon	his	death,	most	of	his	followers	re-associated	and	reconnected	
ties	to	their	former	tribes.	Villages	and	land	in	the	Middle	East,	specifically	Syria,	are	split	
up	and	owned	amongst	the	eclectic	families	of	various	tribes.	These	tribes	were	further	
subdivided	and	each	subdivision	had	its	own	foreman	or	“muqaddam”	(Van	Dam).	Alawi	
tribes	also	had	their	own	religious	leader	who	was	expected	to	perform	the	same	duties	
with	less	power.	In	many	cases	though,	the	religious	leaders	were	so	influential	that	they	
were	able	to	compete	with	the	tribal	leader	for	power	and	leadership	within	a	tribe.	Due	to	
the	land	being	split	up	according	to	family	ties,	most	often	the	tribes	of	these	lands	were	
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acquired	through	inheritance.	However,	there	were	select	instances	where	an	individual	
became	a	tribal	leader	based	not	on	family	connections	but	by	personal	qualities	or	
influence	in	Syrian	power	institutions	at	a	national	level	(Van	Dam).	The	latter	
circumstance	of	gaining	tribal	leadership	allowed	the	opportunity	for	a	few	poor	Alawi	
families	to	be	placed	in	powerful	positions	(Van	Dam).	One	essential	example	of	this	is	
President	Hafiz	al-Asad.	This	family	ultimately	became	the	powerhouse	regime	that	has	led	
the	outbreak	of	civil	war	in	Syria.		
	 The	“Alawi	Mountains”	as	they	were	called,	were	so	remote	and	underdeveloped	
that	the	low	socio-economic	status	of	the	Alawis	was	taken	advantage	of	by	the	Sunnis	
through	inadequate	pay	for	tobacco	sales.	Relations	between	the	two	groups	were	sewn	
with	contempt	and	resentment,	especially	as	poor	Alawi	families	began	selling	their	
daughters	as	house	servants	for	urban	Sunnis	(Van	Dam).	However,	since	the	rise	to	power	
of	the	Asad	regime	and	Ba’th	party	in	1963,	circumstances	for	Alawi	peasants	have	greatly	
improved.	Education	was	highly	sought	after	for	the	Alawi	people.	They	were	able	to	attain	
higher	education	and	more	weighty	degrees	by	their	now	powerful	co-religionist	Ba’th	
party.	Raising	their	status	as	doctors,	lawyers,	engineers	and	university	professors,	“by	the	
1990s	the	Alawi	people	were	rivaling	and	sometimes	displacing	the	Sunni	and	Christian	
intelligentsia”	(Van	Dam).	Syria	experienced	a	transfer	of	power	and	was	now	under	Alawi	
dominated	Ba’thist	rule	(Van	Dam).	Over	time	many	of	the	previously	considered	Sunni	
coastal	cities	had	become	majority	Alawi	through	what	became	known	as	“Alawisation”	
(Van	Dam).	This	trend	also	became	apparent	in	the	suburbs	of	a	major	city	in	Syria,	
Damascus.		
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	 The	Syrian	Druzes,	like	the	Alawis,	experienced	seclusion	and	high	concentration,	
but	in	al-Suwayda.	Their	percent	concentration	is	far	greater	in	al-Suwayda	than	the	Alawis	
in	the	Latakia	region.	The	Druzes	in	the	al-Suwayda	region	have	ancestral	roots	in	Lebanon,	
Palestine	and	the	Aleppo	region.	In	this	region	the	people	are	evenly	distributed	with	the	
urban	and	rural	areas	both	consisting	of	primarily	Druze	peoples.	As	a	result	of	this,	a	
differing	point	between	the	two	regions	that	must	be	addressed	is,	unlike	in	the	Latakia	
region	where	the	traditional	elite	is	a	mixture	of	Alawi,	Christians,	and	Sunni;	the	
traditional	elite	in	al-Suwayda	is	entirely	Druze	(Van	Dam).	These	two	regions	and	their	
populations	are	a	crucial	component	to	understanding	internal	Syrian	relations,	something	
very	central	to	the	civil	war.	The	homogeneous	population	in	al-Suwayda	contributes	to	its	
overall	stronger	regional	identification	and	therefore	social	cohesion	than	is	present	in	
Latakia	where	intra-regional	tensions	are	greater	(Van	Dam).	Therefore,	“Religious-tribal-
feudal	relations,	such	as	those	existing	within	the	Alawi	community,	have	not	occurred	
among	the	Druzes”	(Van	Dam).	When	the	Druze	migrated	from	Lebanon,	Palestine,	and	
Aleppo,	they	were	able	to	dominate	and	lead	in	the	al-Suwayda	region	for	one	of	two	
reasons;	either	“they	numerically	were	a	majority	or	because	villages	were	composed	
almost	entirely	of	members	of	one	extended	family”	(Van	Dam).	The	Druzes	of	this	region	
have	been	marked	by	their	strength	to	show	relatively	consistent	unity.	When	the	central	
Ottoman	government	or	the	Syrian	government	in	Damascus	attempted	to	extend	their	
authority	over	the	Druze,	they	resisted	and	remained	undivided.	Syria	is	a	country	whose	
history	is	full	of	division,	division	in	religion,	ethnicity,	regional	territory,	politics,	and	
more.	One	can	begin	to	see	how	easily	and	even	likely	dissention	among	the	various	groups	
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is,	especially	in	a	region	of	the	world	that	culturally	holds	so	dearly	and	recognizes	so	
firmly	these	differences.	
	 The	province	of	Hama	is	the	major	center	for	the	minority	group	Isma’ilis.	More	
specifically	they	are	located	primarily	in	the	districts	of	Masyaf	and	Salamiyah.	In	the	
eleventh	century	most	Isma’ilis	fled	to	the	mountains	of	the	Latakia	region.	At	this	time	
they	began	to	settle	in	the	towns	of	Masyaf	and	Qadmus.	The	division	of	the	Latakia	region	
between	the	Isma’ilis	and	the	Alawis	was	not	with	good	spirit.	The	Alawis	tended	to	be	
hostile	towards	the	Isma’ilis	who	eventually	migrated	back	to	Salamiyah	“after	the	Ottoman	
Sultan	‘Abd	al-Hamid	II	granted	them	part	of	the	Empire’s	domain	there	in	1845”	(Van	
Dam).	The	Isma’ilis	located	in	the	Alawi	mountains	have	remained	poor	over	time	while	
those	who	returned	to	Salamiyah	advanced	economically	and	socially	(Van	Dam).	This	
contrast	can	be	attributed	to	the	suppression	and	domination	by	the	majority	Alawi	
population	in	the	Latakia	region	over	the	minority	group	of	Isma’ilis.	Whereas	in	Salamiyah	
the	Isma’ilis	are	more	concentrated,	constituting	a	majority,	as	well	as	protected	by	the	
Ottoman	Sultan	having	formally	granted	them	land	there.	This	allows	the	Isma’ilis	to	be	
their	own	elite	and	their	own	leaders	not	having	to	abide	by	another	sect’s	rules	or	
subjections.		
Historians,	reporters,	politicians,	and	various	citizens	of	different	countries	often	
point	to	the	most	obvious	cultural	differences	in	the	Arab	world	as	the	reason	for	its	
troubles	and	downfall.	Sectarianism,	regionalism,	tribalism,	and	class	struggle	are	so	often	
thrown	out	but	never	analyzed.	Yes,	they	play	an	incredibly	imperative	role	in	
understanding	and	studying	Syria	and	their	civil	war.	Yet,	it	is	not	as	simple	as	just	saying	
those	categories.	A	further	and	deeper	understanding	must	be	attained	to	see	the	
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complexities	between	the	categories	and	the	people	that	fall	into	them.	Often	the	problems	
arise	when	people	fall	into	varying	positions	amongst	more	than	one	of	the	categories.	For	
example,	affiliating	with	a	certain	religion	that	doesn’t	match	up	with	your	specific	tribe,	
class,	or	sectarian	views.	This	is	where	conflict	arises.	There	are	categories	or	divisions,	
then	within	those	there	are	subcategories	and	subdivisions,	all	the	way	down	the	pole	until	
there	is	a	plethora	of	offshoots	with	which	a	single	individual	or	group	can	indentify	with.	
When	the	categories	overlap,	it	makes	it	“difficult	to	determine	which	play	a	role	in	a	
particular	situation.	In	the	event	of	overlap,	there	is	a	danger	of	interpreting	tribal	loyalty	
as	regional	and/or	sectarian	loyalties,	for	instance,	or	vice	versa”	(Van	Dam).	In	another	
instance	“sectarian,	regional,	and	tribal	groups	may	in	turn	partially	overlap	with	socio-
economic	differences”	(Van	Dam).	This	causes	issues	because	for	starters	a	religious	
community	usually	is	made	up	of	all	socio-economic	classes.	On	the	flip	side,	“sectarian	
loyalties	can	have	a	catalyzing	influence	on	the	take-off	of	a	class	struggle	if	sectarian	
contrasts	coincide	with	socio-economic	differences”	(Van	Dam).	In	countries	like	the	U.S.	
this	is	praised	to	be	different.	Longed	for	to	be	unique	and	think	for	yourself,	follow	what	
you	believe.	In	the	Middle	East,	in	Syria,	where	ancestral	and	family	views	and	beliefs	are	so	
prided,	where	the	categories	you	identify	with	are	so	highly	examined,	your	differences	can	
be	the	deciding	factor	between	friends	or	enemies,	peace	or	violence.		
	 As	was	seen	previously	in	the	analysis	of	the	various	groups	and	sects	creating	
division	among	Syrians	as	a	whole,	there	is	a	strong	urban-rural	divergence.	The	religious	
minorities	were	compact	in	the	countryside,	the	most	poverty-oriented	area	in	the	country	
while	the	larger	and	wealthy	cities	were	composed	primarily	of	Sunnis.	This	reality	makes	
it	nearly	unattainable	to	separate	the	analysis	of	urban	Sunnis	and	rural	religious	
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minorities	when	studying	the	many	groups	and	differences	the	Syria	is	flooded	with.	Even	
greater	than	that,	“it	is	difficult	if	not	impossible	to	isolate	sectarian,	regional,	tribal	or	
socio-economic	categories	when	they	show	strong	overlap	and	apparently	form	an	
inseparable	whole”	(Van	Dam).	This	is	an	important	keynote	because	it	is	exactly	what	is	at	
play	and	has	been	at	play	for	the	struggle	for	power	between	the	Alawis,	Druzes,	and	
Isma’ilis	in	Syria	since	1963.	
	
IV.	FRENCH	MANDATES	
While	Britain	and	France	laid	claim	to	different	territories	across	the	Middle	East,	
only	one	country	looked	to	France	as	a	supporting	force	and	that	was	Lebanon.	Syria	on	the	
other	hand	despised	the	idea	of	French	control	or	intervention	in	their	country	to	even	the	
smallest	degree.	In	fact,	most	Middle	Eastern	countries	wanted	to	be	independent	of	the	
rules	and	laws	imposed	by	the	allies.	In	an	attempt	to	re-establish	Arab	sentiments	
throughout,	Emir	Feisal	was	sent	as	a	representative	to	the	Paris	peace	conference	where	
he	called	for	reconsideration	of	ally	presence	and	intervention	in	countries	like	Syria	and	
Palestine.	Feisal	argued	that	the	decision	should	be	up	to	the	inhabitants	themselves	on	
whether	they	wanted	this	European	imperial	help	or	not	and	should	be	determined	by	
sending	a	“commission	of	inquiry”	(Mansfield).	President	Wilson	of	the	United	States	
approved	of	this	plan	with	the	suggestion	that	the	commission	be	made	up	of	French,	
British,	Italian	and	American	representatives.	The	British	and	French	though,	were	
obviously	opposed	because	it	would	mean	the	removal	of	their	strongholds	and	their	
power	so	they	withdrew.	Ultimately	it	ended	up	being	solely	Americans	who	carried	out	
the	inquiry.	Their	findings	were	that	the	citizens	of	Syria	and	Palestine	“overwhelmingly	
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opposed	the	proposal	to	place	them	under	great-power	mandates”	(Mansfield).	These	
countries,	aware	of	their	situation	and	current	status,	did	recognize	the	need	for	outside	
help	but	had	requested	it	come	from	the	United	States	or	Britain,	strictly	not	France.	
Despite	the	findings	and	the	suggestions	made	by	the	commission,	the	allies	completely	
ignored	it.	Britain	and	France	chose	to	ignore	it,	for	previously	mentioned	reasons,	and	the	
United	States	because	they	were	on	the	verge	of	isolationism.	Though	the	Allies	were	
known	as	a	unified	front	in	the	international	arena,	they	internally	began	to	battle	with	
each	other.	The	British	government	opened	up	that	it	saw	the	French	ambitions	in	Syria	as	
excessive	(Mansfield).	When	the	French	proceeded	forward	with	their	plans	to	“garrison	
Syria	with	French	troops,	Britain	refused	to	agree”	(Mansfield).	On	March	8,	1920	the	
General	Syrian	Congress	in	Damascus	passed	a	resolution	declaring	the	independence	of	
Syria	and	Palestine.	In	response,	the	Supreme	Council	of	the	League	of	Nations	announced	
its	decision	on	May	5,	1920	that	Syria	would	be	partitioned	into	the	two	French	Mandates	
of	Lebanon	and	Syria	(Mansfield).	Angered	by	the	decisions,	the	Arab	people	of	Syria	
begged	their	leader	Feisal	to	declare	war	on	France.	He	recognized	their	ill-equipped	
military	would	be	no	match	for	the	French	so	instead	he	gave	young,	brash	officers	the	
clearance	to	attack	French	positions.	In	response	the	French	demanded	that	they	be	
allowed	to	occupy	Aleppo,	Homs,	Hama,	and	the	Bekaa	plain,	which	Feisal	accepted.	This	
ultimately	led	to	the	French	completely	seizing	Syria	and	exiling	Feisal.		
	 Now	that	the	mandates	had	been	approved	and	solidified,	the	first	thing	the	French	
did	was	to	enlarge	Lebanon	at	Syria’s	expense	as	to	make	Lebanon	its	Middle	Eastern	
headquarters	(Mansfield).	France	enacted	policy	that	placed	Francophile	Maronite	
Christian	elements	on	Muslim	Arab	peoples.	France	practiced	complete	control	over	society	
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in	Syria	suppressing	any	sort	of	behavior	that	went	against	their	cultural	views	they	were	
attempting	to	implement.	Partitioning	the	Ottoman	Empire	came	with	violence	and	
fighting,	especially	in	Syria.	It	also	created	five	new	Middle	Eastern	states;	Syria,	Lebanon,	
Transjordan,	Iraq	and	Palestine,	all	of	which	were	under	the	control	of	either	Britain	or	
France.	The	mandates	were	backed	and	legitimized	by	the	League	of	Nations	and	instilled	
for	the	sake	of	keeping	their	inhabitants	from	being	returned	to	their	former	masters	as	
well	as	a	form	of	trust	where	the	power	was	administered	to	the	territory	under	
supervision	(Mansfield).	Many	saw	this	as	a	nice	way,	or	politically	correct	way,	of	making	
these	territories	colonies	of	the	British	and	French.	The	result	of	the	French	Mandates	in	
Syria	was	only	a	beginning	glimpse	of	separation	and	division.	France	had	split	Syria	up	in	
an	attempt	to	rule	it	more	easily	by	creating	districts.	These	districts	were	as	follows;	“One	
in	the	Alawite	mountains	in	the	north-east	inhabited	mainly	by	the	sub-Shia	Alawite	sect,	
one	in	the	Jebal	Druze	in	the	south	where	most	of	the	people	were	Druze,	and	one	in	the	
rest	of	Syria	with	Damascus	as	the	capital”	(Mansfield).	It	is	clear	in	understanding	the	
French	impact	on	Syria	why	modern	day	Syria	is	so	deeply	divided.	The	French	were	the	
first	key	component	to	turmoil	and	poor	feelings	amongst	various	groups.	The	“process	of	
political	radicalization	was	initiated	during	the	era	of	the	French	mandate,	the	legacy	of	
which	was	almost	a	guarantee	of	Syria’s	political	instability”	(Fildis).		
Syria	having	finally	won	its	independence	from	France	was	left	in	disarray.	
Everything	the	Syrians	earned	was	not	without	a	fight	and	battle.	This	is	never	a	positive	
way	for	a	nation	to	be	born	as	it	left	it	on	its	side	and	unprepared	for	challenges	that	may	
lay	ahead	after	exhausting	itself	in	determination	of	independence	from	France.	As	author	
McHugo	phrased	it,	“Syria	had	no	allies	and	has	been	aptly	described	as	a	political	orphan.	
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In	addition,	Syrians	now	had	their	own	state	and	a	democracy,	but	that	democracy	was	
fragile-	as	were	the	state	and	its	sense	of	nationhood”	(McHugo).		
	
	
V.	SYRIAN	&	EGYPTIAN	UNION	
	 Another	important	factor	in	the	history	of	Syria	as	an	explanation	for	its	modern	day	
struggles	that	must	be	looked	at	is	the	union	that	took	place	between	Syria	and	Egypt.	The	
union	came	as	a	result	of	the	“bifurcation	of	power	which	led	to	a	stalemate,	preventing	
major	reforms,	but	also	to	such	intense	conflict	that	Syrian	politicians	sought	salvation	in	
union	with	Egypt”	(Hinnebusch).	This	merger	took	place	officially	on	February	2,	1958	as	a	
result	of	the	growing	tensions	between	the	west,	mainly	the	United	States,	and	Middle	
Eastern	countries	like	Syria.		It	was	also	an	outcome	of	“the	inability	to	maintain	a	united	
state”	(Olmert).	This	tension	was	on	the	rise	and	directly	correlated	with	the	growing	
emphasis	and	relationship	between	Syria	and	the	Soviet	Union.	As	time	continued	on	and	
the	Soviet	Union	continued	to	back	Middle	Eastern	countries,	specifically	through	
supplying	them	with	military	equipment,	the	United	States	saw	a	dramatic	increase	in	
threat	from	the	Soviet	camp.	In	1957	Syria	had	accused	Turkey	of	massing	troops	on	its	
frontier,	which	Nasser	responded	to	by	sending	a	body	of	troops	to	Damascus	to	express	
support	(Mansfield).	Old	school	politicians	typically	would	have	preserved	a	relationship	
with	the	west	but	unfortunately	for	Syria	and	its	growing	instability,	the	power	lay	in	the	
hands	of	the	Ba’ath	party.	
Although	it	seemed	support	of	the	Soviet	Union	was	becoming	more	widespread,	
Syria	began	to	fear	a	communist	takeover	and	so	saw	diversion	through	union	with	Egypt.	
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When	this	merger	became	complete	on	February	2,	1958	the	presidents	of	the	two	
countries	announced	the	name	of	their	new	territory	as	the	United	Arab	Republic.	King	
Saud	of	Syria	was	forced	to	resign	when	it	became	evident	that	he	had	plans	to	assassinate	
Egyptian	President	Nasser	to	prevent	the	union	of	Syria	and	Egypt	(Mansfield).	King	Saud’s	
brother	Feisal	took	over,	as	he	was	known	for	being	more	pro-Egyptian.	Things	quickly	
spiraled	downhill	for	Syria	as	pressure	from	Iraqi	leader	Karim	Kassem	was	exerted	in	an	
effort	to	destroy	the	relationship	between	Syria	and	Egypt	(Mansfield).	Kassem	and	his	
organization	overthrew	the	regime	in	Syria,	declared	a	republic,	and	killed	Feisal	and	his	
family	members.	This	new	republic	of	Iraq	under	Kassem	declared	its	support	for	Egypt	
and	Nasser	and	Nasserism	became	the	ruling	ideology	in	Syria.	
This	quickly	spreading	takeover	of	a	pro-Arab	community	along	with	the	
destruction	of	pro-western	sites	in	the	Middle	East	gave	way	to	fear	and	activated	a	
response	on	the	west’s	part.	The	United	States	and	Britain	intervened	with	troops	to	their	
last	few	camp	locations	holding	on	to	their	thread	of	an	attachment	to	the	Middle	East.	
While	this	was	happening,	Nasser	was	headed	for	a	downfall	in	his	reign.	His	goal,	hefty	and	
ambitious,	would	ultimately	fail	as	the	vastly	different	states	of	the	Middle	East	were	too	
ideologically	different	and	religiously	diverse	to	have	pan-Arabism	unite	them.	
Feelings	between	Syria	and	Egypt	became	rocky	as	the	Syrian’s	realized,	though	
their	ideologies	were	similar,	they	were	still	very	different.	On	top	of	this,	the	Ba’ath	party	
demanded	power	to	rule	in	Syria	while	Nasser	would	have	none	of	that	under	the	
“umbrella	rule	of	his	authority	and	prestige”	(Mansfield).	The	new	political	structure	in	
Syria	was	shaped	after	the	Egyptian	one	and	although	Nasser	appointed	two	Syrian	vice-
presidents	and	many	ministers	to	the	government,	he	never	gave	them	full	control	as	
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power	always	remained	in	his	own	hands.	The	union	between	the	two	states	rapidly	fell	
apart	for	a	couple	of	reasons.	First,	the	Syrians	began	to	feel	that	they	were	no	longer	
partners	with	Egypt	rather	being	completely	watched	over.	Second,	the	Syrians	felt	the	
Egyptians	didn’t	hold	a	high	energetic	pro-Arab	rationale	as	they	did.	Third,	Syria,	which	
had	always	been	built	on	a	free	economy,	watched	as	Nasser’s	socialist	principles	were	
imposed	upon	them	(Mansfield).	Next,	Syria’s	agricultural	sector	suffered	three	years	of	
consecutive	draughts	between	1958	and	1960	(Mansfield).	Despite	his	best	efforts,	Nasser,	
like	many	others,	failed	to	stabilize	Syria	and	find	a	working	government	for	its	people.	On	
September	28,	1961	a	group	of	Syrian	army	officers	rebelled	(Mansfield).	This	marked	the	
end	of	the	union	between	the	two	in	an	effort	to	create	a	United	Arab	Republic.	Though	
Nasser	let	them	leave,	he	also	stated	that	they	would	always	be	welcome	back	should	they	
feel	so	inclined	to	rejoin.	
The	attempted	union	between	two	similar	states	shows	the	mess	and	failure	that	
continues	to	be	Syria.	It	is	so	structurally	and	internally	damaged	and	broken	that	the	
diverse	population	and	strong-sided	views	create	a	hostile	environment	where	turmoil	is	
inevitable.	As	history	continues	on	it	is	clear	that	with	each	passing	event,	Syria	is	nearly	a	
lost	cause	when	even	fellow	Middle	Eastern	countries	are	failing	at	intervention	in	last	
hopes	of	saving	it.	Civil	war	is	clearly	in	the	path	ahead.	 	
What	became	known	as	the	Separatist	Movement	from	1961-1963	proved	not	only	
to	show	a	separation	of	the	Sunnis	and	minorities,	but	a	change	of	power	in	major	political	
roles	as	well.	The	Military	Command	was	predominantly	led,	with	most	authoritative	
positions	being	held,	by	Sunnis.	The	military	had	a	stronghold	in	Damascus,	which	as	we	
know	from	earlier,	was	a	major	Sunni	controlled	city.	The	Syrian	Army	Command	was	
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made	up	of	ten	members,	five	Damascene	Sunnis,	four	of	the	five	others	were	Sunni,	and	
one	was	Druze.	The	Syrian	Officers	Corps	recognized	the	power	being	held	by	Damascene	
Sunnis,	and	demanded	that	a	non-Damascene	commander-in-chief	be	appointed.	Druze	
Major-General	‘Abd	al-Karim	Zahr	al-Din,	then	fourth	in	seniority,	accepted	this	position	
(Van	Dam).	However,	Sunni	Damascene	al-Nahlawi	occupied	the	key	military	position	of	
deputy	director	of	officers’	affairs,	a	position	that	allowed	him	to	move	and	control	officers	
he	wanted	to	units	he	preferred.	In	other	words,	he	could	set	himself	up	to	be	even	more	
powerful	by	moving	certain	officers	to	positions	and	units	that	best	supported	him.	
Unfortunately	for	him,	he	never	could	gain	solid	support	amongst	the	non-Damascenes,	
which	would	ultimately	play	a	key	role	in	the	downfall	of	his	and	his	fellow	Damascene	
officers.	In	a	last	effort	to	hold	onto	his	dwindling	power,	he	orchestrated	a	military	coup	
that	failed	and	resulted	in	his	and	five	of	his	greatest	Damascene	military	colleagues	
expulsion	from	Syria.	There	was	a	clear	separation	between	the	Damascene	and	non-
Damascene	within	the	military.	The	Homs	Military	Congress	was	to	convene	in	an	attempt	
to	dilute	any	violent	actions	from	occurring.	However,	at	the	congress,	Damascene	
Lieutenant-Colonel	Muti	al-Samman	demanded	that	six	non-Damascene	officers	be	
expelled	from	Syria	in	equal	composition	for	the	removal	of	al-Nahlawi	(Van	Dam).	Quite	
the	opposite	affect	ended	up	taking	place.	Over	the	next	couple	of	years	Damascene	officers	
and	military	members	were	slowly	purged	from	any	sort	of	politically	strategic	position	
and	were	replaced	with,	as	the	then	Druze	General	Zahr	al-Din	put	it,	“officers	who	
harbored	nothing	but	hatred	and	aversion	towards	Damascus	and	its	inhabitants”	(Van	
Dam).	The	military	was	dwindling	its	numbers	in	Sunni	and	Damascene	representation	and	
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was	growing	stronger	and	stronger	with	minorities,	a	powerful	hand	to	hold	for	the	
minorities,	and	a	politically	strategic	one	at	that.		
	 The	monopolization	of	power	by	the	minority	groups	in	Syria	did	not	stop	there.	It	
grew	even	stronger	in	1963	when	a	military	coup	by	Ba’thists	succeeded	in	bringing	down	
this	“separatist	regime”	and	instead	strengthened	its	numbers	in	minorities	at	the	expense	
of	the	Sunnis.	This	was	a	direct	result	of	the	Ba’ath	military	leaders	whom	quickly	put	into	
positions	of	power	and	leadership,	family	members	and	friends	from	their	own	choosing.	
Most	of	these	people	called	up	then,	were	mainly	Alawis,	Druzes,	and	Isma’ilis	(Van	Dam).	
The	minorities	were	only	picking	up	steam.	Though	they	once	had	lived	lives	in	the	poor	
countryside	of	Syria,	they	were	finding	themselves	growing	stronger	as	a	cohesive	unit,	
gaining	military	power,	and	therefore	political	power.	A	role	that	required	them	to	tread	
lightly	with	their	newfound	power,	so	as	not	to	abuse	it,	and	not	to	lose	it.		
	
VI.	ISRAELI	&	SYRIAN	CONFLICT	
The	next	important	historical	focal	point	in	understanding	today’s	civil	war	in	Syria	
is	the	debate	over	Zionism	resulting	in	a	Syrian	war	with	Israel.	Following	the	end	of	World	
War	One,	the	peace	settlement	declared	Palestine	in	1918	a	Jewish	state	for	refugees	to	go	
and	settle.	However,	Palestine	still	consisted	of	strong	Arab	Nationalists	who	showed	
disdain	for	their	new	neighbors	and	frustration	and	anger	over	the	Jewish	population	
receiving	their	land.	Upon	asking	for	reconsideration	or	a	different	area	to	be	the	
designated	place	for	Jewish	refugees	following	the	Holocaust,	tensions	began	to	rise	as	the	
Allied	powers	denied	their	request.	Ultimately,	it	was	decided	that	Palestine	would	be	split	
into	two	new	states,	one	that	would	be	known	as	modern	day	Israel.	Israel	was	to	be	the	
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land	for	the	Jewish	population;	this	allowed	them	to	carry	out	Zionism.	Many	international	
leaders	saw	this	as	a	resolution	to	the	problem,	but	instead	Palestine	Arab’s	grew	in	their	
anger	and	hate	and	pulled	in	their	own	allies,	which	consisted	of	many	countries	that	
bordered	Israel,	including	Syria.	Violent	revolts	began	to	break	out	and	border	battles	and	
land/territory	ownership	became	the	new	topic	of	debate	amongst	the	Middle	East	(Oren).	
This	is	what	eventually	led	to	a	battle	between	Israel	and	much	of	the	Middle	East,	though	
they	were	backed	by	Britain	and	France,	and	more	specifically	with	Syria.	A	great	portion	of	
discontent	between	Israel	and	Syria,	which	also	continues	today,	is	the	struggle	over	the	
Golan	Heights.	This	piece	of	land	was	seen	as	a	prime	territorial	control	of	the	Syrians	but	
was	partitioned	off	to	the	Israelis.	It	has	since	then	been	the	topic	of	great	discussion	and	
reconsideration	and	now	even	battle	over	with	whom	it	should	belong.	This	unfinished	
business	and	inability	to	come	to	a	fair	and	satisfying	conclusion	between	the	two	countries	
has	pitted	them	against	one	another	historically,	and	still	today.	
	 The	Arab	revolt	of	1936-39	is	arguably	what	pulled	in	more	of	the	Middle	East	than	
just	Palestine.	It	is	seen	as	the	spreading	the	conflict	no	longer	between	Jews	and	Arabs	in	
Palestine	rather	Zionism	and	Arabs	everywhere	(Oren).	On	May	14	when	the	British	
Mandate	ended,	the	regional	battle	broke	out	against	Israel.	Syria	and	Iraq	were	the	two	
bordering	nations	who	led	the	invasion.	Egypt	eventually	joined	out	of	fear	of	other	Middle	
Eastern	states	growing	their	territories	in	the	process	(Oren).	Egypt	had	also	signed	a	
mutual	defense	agreement	with	Syria	in	1966.	Unfortunately	for	them,	Syria	became	
quickly	dissatisfied	with	the	efforts	to	demolish	Israel	and	Zionism	and	took	it	upon	
themselves	to	be	the	leader	in	doing	so.	
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	 Syrian	tanks	rained	thirty-one	shells	on	Kibbutz	Almagor,	killing	one	and	wounding	
two	others	by	the	end	of	the	attack	(Oren).	This	was	the	start	of	the	Syrian	effort	to	move	
from	the	defensive	to	attack.	Though	there	was	no	clear	understanding	in	why	the	Syrians	
had	become	so	abruptly	violent	and	determined	on	the	matter,	it	is	important	to	point	out	
that	the	Ba’ath	party	of	the	time	had	a	strong	ideological	belief	in	the	elimination	of	Israel,	
Zionism,	and	imperialism		(Oren).	It	should	also	be	noted	that	another	factor	in	Syria’s	
involvement	was	a	direct	result	of	their	current	conflict	with	Iraq	over	the	Iraq	Petroleum	
Company.	Syria	was	up	in	arms	over	their	payment	received	for	allowing	Iraqi	oil	to	flow	
over	their	land.	Much	of	this	newly	found	resentment	on	the	topic,	clearly	stemmed	from	
the	fact	that	the	IPC	was	a	British	owned	company	and	was	therefore	an	imperialist	
presence	in	the	Middle	East	that	Syria	was	determined	to	rid	of.	Another	important	catalyst	
of	war	between	Syria	and	Israel	stemmed	from	the	Soviet	Union	pressure	and	misleading	
information	upon	Syria.	The	Soviet	Union	was	publicly	announcing	that	it	was	avoiding	
conflict	in	the	Arab	Middle	East,	though	it	was	actually	pushing	Syria	to	become	more	
active.	The	Soviet	Union	saw	this	as	their	chance	to	attain	their	longtime	goal	of	owning	key	
waterways	in	the	Middle	East	and	isolating	Turkey	(Oren).		
	 All	of	these	reasons	were	key	players	in	Syria’s	move	to	attack	Israel,	but	one	ever-
present	issue	in	Syria	was	the	ultimate	catalyst.	Syria	so	internally	divided	officers	against	
civilian	“doctors	with	President	al-Atassi	and	foreign	minister	Makhous,	Hafez	al-Assad	
with	support	of	the	air	force,	the	army	pitted	against	President	Jadid,	and	both	generals	
were	opposed	by	Intelligence	Chief	Abd’	al-Karim	al-Jundi	(Oren).	Explosions,	fighting,	
attempted	assassinations,	were	all	becoming	part	of	a	typical	day	in	Syria.	This	internal	
strife	played	a	direct	hand	in	the	internal	insecurity	of	the	Syrian	Regime	leading	them	to	
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feel	a	desperate	desire	to	“out-Nasser-Nasser”	(Oren).	In	an	attempt	to	diffuse	the	
mounting	tension	on	the	borders	specifically	but	between	Israel	and	Syria	as	a	whole,	a	
meeting	or	conference	was	held	where	they	were	asked	to	uphold	their	previously	signed	
agreement	to	refrain	from	acts	of	hostility.	Both	denied	the	agreement	and	eventually	the	
meeting	came	to	a	close	with	feelings	more	bitter	than	when	they	had	arrived	and	less	
likely	to	come	to	any	sort	of	agreement.	Syria	and	Israel	continued	attacks	on	each	other,	
and	they	even	began	to	multiply	on	the	border.	Syria	had	begun	to	back	Palestine	in	their	
acts	of	aggression	against	Israel	as	well.	It	went	so	far	that	the	United	States	recognized	and	
announced	that	the	Syrians	were	not	going	to	stop	until	war	broke	out.	For	that,	the	
Americans	implored	the	Israelis	to	disregard	their	long-standing	opposition	to	retaliations	
(Oren).		
	 War	broke	out	in	what	became	titled	the	“Six	Days	War”.	The	shortest	war	in	
history,	the	Israelis	battled	against	multiple	Arab	states.	Shocking	to	many,	Israel	came	
through	victorious	and	with	overwhelming	numbers.	Syria	was	later	blamed	for	having	
started	a	war	in	which	they	did	not	really	participate	fighting	in.	Yet,	far	after	the	war	Syria	
continued	to	denounce	Israel	and	Zionism	and	yet	perpetually	battles	itself	within	its	own	
borders.	Syria	strongly	rejected	approval	of	a	peace	treaty	with	Israel	and	openly	shared	its	
disapproval	of	the	Egyptian-Israeli	Peace	Treaty.	Though	Syria	had	Soviet	backing	and	
other	states	at	war	with	them,	their	internal	strife	and	struggle	ultimately	led	to	their	
defeat	against	Israel	and	the	Allies.	Syria’s	greatest	loss	in	this	battle	with	Israel	however,	
rose	from	the	loss	of	territory:	the	Golan	Heights.	The	Golan	Heights	is	a	plateau	that	is	
bordered	by	the	Sea	of	Galilee,	Hula	Valley,	Yarmouk	River,	Mount	Hernon,	and	Wadi	
Raqqad.	It	was	originally	and	area	considered	part	of	Syria	but	was	conquered	by	the	
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Israelis	during	the	Six	Day	War.	The	fallout	between	Israel	and	Syria	has	continued	for	
years	as	a	result	of	the	dispute	over	this	piece	of	land.	Today	it	has	contributed	to	the	
Syrian	Civil	War,	as	it	has	become	a	stronghold	for	the	terrorist	organization	ISIS	to	carry	
out	attack	across	the	Middle	East,	infiltrate	refugee	movements,	and	contribute	to	the	
overall	instability	and	violence	in	Syria.	Israeli	Prime	Minister	Benjamin	Netanyahu	
requested	Israel	be	allowed	to	impose	Israeli	law	in	an	attempt	to	help	oust	the	presence	of	
terrorist	activity	due	to	the	fact	that	Syria	is	incapable	because	as	the	Prime	Minister	put	it,	
“Syria	has	disintegrated	beyond	the	point	of	reunification”.	His	requests	were	denied	and	
ISIS	and	the	struggle	for	control	of	the	Golan	Heights	rages	on	perpetuating	the	instability,	
violence,	and	strife	throughout	Syria.	
	
VII.	HAFIZ	AL-ASAD’S	RISE	TO	POWER	
Syria’s	tumultuous	political	and	social	history	has	led	up	to	the	point	of	Hafiz	al-
Asad	taking	command.	It	is	clear	that	with	the	inability	to	maintain	stability	with	both	
internal	and	external	influence,	the	struggle	for	power	will	continue	to	occur.	Under	French	
Mandate	and	unity	with	Egypt,	Syria	still	made	irrational	decisions	and	fought	against	help	
from	anyone	exactly	like	themselves.	The	country	burned	bridges	with	not	only	the	Allies	of	
the	west	but	also	with	fellow	Middle	Eastern	countries	as	well,	leaving	them	to	fend	for	
themselves	with	bad	blood	surrounding	them.	Understanding	the	sectarian,	regional,	and	
tribal	divide	of	the	country	also	demonstrates	the	lack	of	one	cohesive	unit	to	progress	
forward	in	any	sort	of	groundbreaking	decision-making.	Much	of	this	stems	from	the	ethnic	
and	religious	differences	that	are	seen	as	so	great	a	divide,	they	are	unable	to	trust	their	
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own	fellow	Syrians	from	various	groups.	These	factors	are	all	what	have	led	us	to	the	battle	
for	power	between	al-Asad	and	Salah	Jadid.		
	 Jadid’s	power	stemmed	from	his	control	on	a	large	portion	of	the	armed	forces	and	
military	through	inside	connections.	However,	on	the	flip	side,	al-Asad	was	minister	of	
defense	giving	him	the	upper	hand	along	with	his	role	as	the	Ba’thist	Military	Committee.	
Difference	of	opinion	in	the	country	led	to	the	Arab	military	defeat	in	1967	and	ultimately	
to	tensions	rising.	The	two	sides	of	the	argument	consisted	of	the	ideological	view	of	
pursuing	a	society	based	on	socialist	ideals	or	a	society	based	on	Arab	nationalist	policy.	
Asad	and	Jadid	represented	each	of	these	political	sides	at	the	Regional	and	National	Ba’th	
Party	Congress.	Jadid	believed	in	a	“socialist	transformation”	with	greater	dependence	on	
the	Soviet	Union	and	other	Communist	countries	(Van	Dam).	This	group	also	rejected	
anything	“reactionary,	rightest,	or	pro-western”	(Van	Dam).	Asad	on	the	otherside	believed	
in	an	Arab	nationalist	leaning	with	focus	on	the	struggle	with	Israel	and	defeating	them	
(Van	Dam).	Jadid	dominated	Asad	at	the	congress,	winning	majority	of	the	support,	yet	
Asad	was	not	satisfied	with	this.	Asad	used	his	military	connections	and	titles	to	gain	
control,	support,	and	ultimately	power	of	the	armed	forces.	This	then	forced	Jadid	to	grip	
tighter	onto	his	civilian	party	apparatus.	This	created	the	biggest	divide	in	Syria	we	see	
today;	the	armed	forces	and	the	civilian	apparatus	of	the	Ba’th	in	Syria.	
	 Asad	made	his	move	for	control	by	abducting	the	then	chief	of	the	national	security	
and	general	intelligence	services	as	well	as	a	handful	of	Jadid’s	other	aides	and	supporters.	
The	confrontation	between	the	two	leaders	continued	to	grow	when	in	1970	Syrian	
political	leaders	made	the	decision	to	intervene	in	the	Jordanian	civil	war,	which	ultimately	
failed.	The	Tenth	Extraordinary	National	Congress	of	the	Ba’th	Party	was	convened	in	1970	
	
	
Baltes		
30	
in	an	attempted	effort	at	finding	a	solution	to	the	party	struggle.	Al-Asad	and	his	supporters	
strategically	prepared	themselves	for	a	defense	attack	should	al-Asad	be	less	favored	than	
Jadid	in	the	conference.	As	was	feared,	Jadid	held	overwhelming	support	from	those	
members	of	the	congress.	Asad	responded	in	attacks	through	the	taking	of	civilian	party	
sections	and	capturing	and	arresting	prominent	leaders	like	Jadid	from	the	opposite	party.	
Many	other	high	political	members	fled	the	country	from	fear	of	arrest	leaving	Asad	to	
monopolize	his	newfound	power	marking	the	start	to	his	new	regime	in	November	1970,	
and	eventually	to	Asad	in	1971	being	named	Syria’s	first	Alawi	president	(Van	Dam).	The	
period	of	Sunni	rule	had	come	to	an	end,	and	the	Hafiz	al-Asad	Regime	now	raged.		
	 Under	Asad’s	rule,	he	used	his	position	and	power	to	suppress	any	sort	of	uprising	
that	may	have	been	stirred	up	in	anticipation	to	oust	him.	One	very	important	example	of	
this	was	the	1982	Hama	Massacre.	During	this	massacre	Syrian	security	forces	entered	the	
densely	populated	old	city	of	Hama	in	an	attempt	to	seize	weapons	possibly	held	by	
Islamist	militants.	The	situation	escalated	as	attack	sirens	raged	through	the	night,	
concerning	the	local	residents	and	influencing	them	to	attack	the	troops	in	the	town.	As	
armed	militants	began	to	battle	with	the	security	forces	in	a	brutal	showdown,	Hafiz	al-
Asad’s	brother	“rushed	to	the	area	and	from	the	heights	of	the	nearby	citadel,	rained	
artillery	and	tank	fire	into	the	town,	leveling	its	major	commercial	and	residential	districts”	
(Lawson).	Hama	was	known	for	its	outbreaks	of	challenge	against	the	Ba’th	Regime.	The	
1982	uprising	changed	perspectives	as	it	now	became	known	for	“its	massive	scale,	the	
broad	range	of	social	forces	that	took	part,	the	high	degree	of	organization	evidenced	by	its	
leaders,	and	the	ruthlessness	with	which	it	was	crushed”	(Lawson).	The	result	was	
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widespread	as	even	moderate	Islamists	scaled	back	their	activity	drastically.	For	a	decade,	
the	cities	ruins	were	left	to	“stand	as	a	stark	warning	to	other	dissidents”	(Lawson).	
To	understand	further	Asad’s	reign	and	the	paradox	behind	his	rise	to	power,	we	
must	next	take	a	look	at	the	Ba’th	party	in	general,	further	leading	to	the	hate	between	the	
Alawites	and	Sunnis.	It	became	a	question	of	discrepancy	as	to	“how	Ba’thist	officers	from	
one	minority	sect,	the	Alawis,	emerged	as	a	seemingly	dominant	clique,	most	manifest	after	
1970	under	Hafiz	al-Asad,	was	explained	by	factors	such	as	their	disproportionate	
recruitment	into	the	army	and	party	before	1963	and	class	and	regional	divisions	among	
the	majority	Sunni	actors”	(Hinnebusch).	The	Ba’th	party	was	a	political	group	originally	
known	as	“The	Party	of	the	Arab	Renaissance”	(Ben-Tzur).	This	party	was	first	established	
in	Syria	in	the	forties	as	a	party	of	the	urban	petit-bourgeois	intelligentsia	(Ben-Tzur).	The	
ideology	of	this	Arab	party	was	formulated	after	a	doctrine	from	the	party	platform	at	the	
first	convention	in	1947.	The	doctrine	of	this	convention	was	“a	blend	of	nationalist	pan-
Arab	radicalism	with	a	moderate	social	programme-agrarian	reform	and	partial	
nationalization	without	infringing	individual	property	rights,	and	with	a	neutralist	policy	
towards	the	global	struggle	between	the	communist	and	western	blocs”	(Ben-Tzur).	This	
Syrian	political	party	has	not	consistently	been	active	in	Syria	however.	There	was	a	period	
in	1958-59	where	the	party	had	dissolved	in	Syria	but	remained	alive	in	other	Middle	
Eastern	countries.	After	three	conferences	in	Lebanon,	the	Syrian	Ba’th	party	was	re-
established.		
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In	1958	Syria	and	Egypt	were	to	be	unified.	However,	before	this	plan	would	be	
carried	out,	Egyptian	President	Nasser	demanded	all	Syrian	political	parties,	including	the	
Ba’ath	party,	be	dissolved	prior	to	unification	(Van	Dam).	It	wasn’t	until	May	1962	that	the	
Ba’ath	Party’s	National	Command	made	the	decision	to	rebuild	the	party	bastion	that	had	
once	existed	in	Syria.	By	this	time,	many	of	the	former	members	of	the	Ba’ath	party	had	
found	new	political	parties	to	associate	with.	On	March	8,	1963	a	group	of	Ba’athist	officers	
and	others	seized	power	in	Syria	through	a	military	coup.	The	Ba’athist	military	leaders	
each	claimed	some	level	of	new	government	responsibility,	but	there	were	not	enough	
Ba’athist	civilians	to	cope	with	the	extent	of	it	all.	Though	Nasser	had	demanded	the	
dissolution	of	all	political	parties,	some	Ba’athists	in	Syria	had	secretly	remained	organized.	
So,	following	the	coup	of	1963	these	party	members	played	a	prominent	role	in	the	Syrian	
civilian	party	apparatus	thanks	to	their	close	ties	with	the	leaders	of	the	Ba’athist	military	
party	organization	which	held	actual	power	in	Syria	now	(Van	Dam).	There	had	been	rules	
and	regulations	set	in	place	to	limit	the	party	supporters,	by	the	party	themselves,	or	rather	
a	process	they	had	to	make	it	through	to	become	an	active	member.	At	this	point	in	time	
though,	they	were	so	low	on	civilian	members,	participation,	and	support	that	they	passed	
a	resolution	allowing	all	supporters	to	be	promoted	to	active	members	(Van	Dam).	
However,	this	was	taken	advantage	of	as	many	leaders	of	the	Ba’ath	Party	used	it	to	have	
relatives,	friends,	and	acquaintances	added	to	the	party	without	them	meeting	any	of	the	
previously	established	restrictions	and	guidelines,	which	they	might	not	have	otherwise.	
This	in	turn	created	an	extensive	amount	of	party	blocs	whose	members	were	connected	
not	by	ideological	principles	but	rather	by	sectarian,	regional,	or	tribal	backgrounds	(Van	
Dam).	This	drove	further	division,	now	amongst	the	party	itself.		
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What	was	once	division	between	the	party	members	and	those	who	were	non-
members	had	now	grown	to	division	among	the	members.	It	created	a	serious	power	
struggle	in	both	the	civilian	and	military	party	organization	because	it	undermined	party	
discipline	(Van	Dam).	The	rival	divisions	within	the	party	were	not	even	seen	as	differing	
for	ideological	reasons	as	many	would	have	understood	more.		Factionalism	was	another	
prominent	issue	amongst	the	Ba’ath	Party,	particularly	during	elections.	One	author	states	
that,	“as	a	result	[of	the	factionalism]	some	party	members	were	not	always	free	to	choose	
their	leaders,	and	this	in	turn	caused	some	of	the	most	capable	members	to	be	prevented	
from	attaining	commanding	positions”	(Van	Dam).	The	corruption	during	elections	was	far	
reaching.	Sometimes	it	would	be	Ba’athist	dominated	power	institutions	who	interfered	in	
elections	to	push	their	own	preferred	list	of	people	and	sometimes	it	was	non-party	
members	who	did	what	they	could	to	sway	the	voting	in	the	direction	they	desired.	In	one	
case,	there	were	so	many	irregularities	observed	that	the	Syrian	Command	had	to	call	for	
new	elections	(Van	Dam).		
	 Who	makes	up	the	military	of	a	country,	and	who	has	influence	over	it,	are	very	
important.	The	Syrian	armed	forces	were	strongly	made	up	of	minorities	before	the	Ba’thist	
officers	took	over	in	1963.	This	influence	in	the	army,	of	minorities,	can	be	attributed	to	
politico-historical	and	socio-economic	factors.	One	of	these	factors	dates	back	to	when	
Syria	was	under	French	Mandate	and	they	recruited	Alawis,	Druzes,	Isma’ilis,	Christians,	
Kurds,	and	Circassians,	while	they	discouraged	Sunni	Arab’s	(Van	Dam).	Sunni	Arab	
landowning	commercial	families	were	fine	with	this	arrangement,	as	they	felt	their	sons	
should	not	be	sent	for	military	training	to	defend	what	they	saw	as	“French	Imperial	
Interests”	(Van	Dam).	Furthermore,	the	majority	Sunni	Arab’s	saw	the	military	as	a	place	
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for	those	economically	and	socially	below	them.	More	specifically	those	who	could	not	
excel	in	society	on	their	own	or	through	education.	So,	they	saw	it	as	an	insult	to	be	a	part	
of	the	military.	On	the	flip	side,	those	minorities	who	struggled	to	make	ends	meet	saw	
joining	the	military	as	a	way	to	boost	themselves	in	society	and	make	a	decent	living.		
The	Ba’th	Party,	which	came	to	power	in	1963,	is	the	cornerstone	of	the	rise	of	the	
Syrian	minorities.	This	political	group	came	about	through	social	channels	that	define	
whom	its	followers	are.	It	was	a	group	seeking	out	socialist	ideals,	allowing	all	individuals	
to	be	equal	despite	religious,	tribal,	or	geographic	affiliations.	It	supported	the	idea	of	Arab	
Nationalism,	though	the	Sunnis	felt	it	was	representing	everything	Arab	Nationalism	
wasn’t.	The	Ba’ath	party	was	founded	in	Damascus	in	1940	by	Michel	‘Aflaq,	a	Greek	
Orthodox	Christian,	and	Salah	al-Din	Bitar,	a	Sunni	Muslim,	both	who	were	teachers	and	
part	of	the	middle	class	(Van	Dam).	As	a	result	of	their	occupations,	most	of	the	people	they	
recruited	and	sought	out	to	join	their	party	were	students	of	higher	education	that	were	
most	often	migrants	who	had	come	to	Damascus	for	higher	education.	Though	there	was	
not	a	laid	out	plan	of	action	the	party	began	to	spread	amongst	the	minorities	of	Syria	with	
no	rhyme	or	reason.	The	strong	showing	of	Druze	amongst	the	Ba’ath	party	is	often	
attributed	to	the	leader	‘Aflaq’a	relationship	with	many	families	of	the	Jabal-al	Duruz	(Van	
Dam).	Many	of	the	people	who	constituted	the	greatest	areas	of	poverty	and	rural	areas,	
are	those	who	were	pulled	to	the	Ba’ath	party	based	on	their	socialist	ideals	versus	those	of	
the	cities,	as	mentioned	before,	that	were	made	up	of	the	wealthy	or	“bourgeoisie”.	The	
Ba’ath	party	took	up	the	ideas	of	Arab	Nationalism	as	well.	While	this	angered	many	
Sunnis,	who	had	been	the	group	to	most	closely	identify,	the	Ba’ath	party	had	their	own	
understanding	and	interpretation	of	Arab	Nationalism.	To	them,	one	did	not	have	to	full	
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identify	as	religiously	Islamic.	They	need	only	recognize	that	this	is	the	culture,	the	
background	with	which	they	come	from;	it	was	their	Arab	heritage.	One	of	the	leaders	and	
founders	of	the	Ba’ath	party	even	said	that	Christian	Arabs	for	example,	should	in	no	way	
feel	restricted	from	also	being	an	Arab	Nationalist	(Van	Dam).	These	views	economically	
with	socialism	being	a	main	tool	of	the	Ba’ath	party,	religiously	with	the	acceptance	of	
outside	religions,	and	the	belief	that	these	minorities	could	still	associate	with	the	sacred	
Arab	Nationalism,	created	great	dissention	among	the	minorities	of	Syria	and	they	majority	
Sunni	of	Syria.	Not	only	the	religious	differences	but	also	the	social,	economic,	and	
geographic	differences	made	it	incredibly	difficult	for	the	party	to	attract	both	minorities	
and	Sunnis.	This	was	the	start	friction.	
There	were	different	branches	of	the	Ba’ath	party	based	on	the	location	and	city.	
The	Damascus	branch	was	very	small.	The	urban-rural	differentiation	and	
Damascene/non-Damascene	contrast	was	strong	in	this	branch.	Rightfully	so,	as	Damascus	
would	be	made	up	predominantly	of	Sunnis,	the	majority	population,	and	were	hesitant	to	
join	the	Ba’ath	Party	of	predominantly	minorities.	The	Hama	Branch	had	very,	very	little	
support.	Located	in	the	city	of	Hama,	the	Ba’ath	party	was	up	against	a	Sunni	stronghold.	
While	the	geographic	difference	is	what	created	friction	amongst	the	Ba’ath	Party	members	
and	non-members	in	Damascus,	in	Hama	it	was	based	more	on	the	sectarian	differences.	In	
April	1964,	the	strong	opposition	of	the	Ba’ath	party	was	played	out	when	an	anti-Ba’thist	
revolt	occurred	backed	by	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	(Van	Dam).	One	could	qualify	the	revolt	
as	a	success	based	on	the	fact	that	Ba’ath	Party	activities	came	to	a	standstill.		
The	Ba’ath	party	had	flaws	of	its	own	in	its	creation	and	coming	to	military	power.	
The	leaders	wanted	to	organize	the	party	to	be	larger	and	a	cohesive	unit,	but	like	
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elsewhere	in	Syria	at	the	time,	it	was	a	battle	for	power	even	internally.	In	an	effort	to	grow	
the	party	in	size	and	number,	the	leaders	began	recruiting	more	members.	However,	the	
members	were	granted	admission	despite	not	meeting	qualifications	nor	having	support	
for	the	Party’s	views.	Instead,	membership	was	granted	to	those	whom	the	organizations	
leaders	felt	would	keep	them	most	protected	in	their	positions	of	power.	Beyond	that,	those	
members	eventually	came	to	power	and	leadership	roles	within	the	organization	and	
began	transforming	it	into	whatever	they	wanted	it	to	become,	overshadowing	and	
minimizing	those	members	who	had	risked	everything	for	the	party’s	sake	including	their	
lives.	Sectarian	polarization	was	at	the	forefront	and	paved	the	way	for	sectarian	
discrimination.	The	sectarian	discrimination	began	to	take	form	on	the	part,	shockingly,	of	
the	minorities.	The	removal	and	dismissal	of	Sunni	leaders	in	the	armed	forces	was	
shameless	and	brutal.	So	much	so	that	main	branch	leaders	were	being	dismissed	such	as	
the	leader	of	the	National	Guard	and	the	leader	of	the	Air	Force	(Van	Dam).	Those	given	
preferential	treatment	for	the	position	openings	tended	to	be	Alawis,	Druzes,	Isma’ilis	and	
Christians,	all	minorities.	The	minorities	in	charge	would	strategically	place	those	they	
trusted,	fellow	minority	members,	in	positions	of	greater	importance,	while	Sunnis	would	
be	placed	in	positions	farthest	away	from	main	cities	(Van	Dam).	The	entire	army	
command	structure	and	discipline	were	undermined	by	the	manipulation	of	sectarian	ties	
and	loyalties	(Van	Dam).	To	attain	a	grasp	on	how	hostile	the	sectarian	divisions	were,	a	
British	Consular	report	from	the	1870’s	stated,	“they	hate	each	other…Sunnis	boycott	the	
Shi’ites…both	resent	the	Druze…all	despise	the	Alawites”	(Olmert).	
The	Ba’th	party	has	not	existed	without	struggle,	similar	to	Syria	itself.	After	
agreeing	to	the	union	with	Egypt,	many	citizens	of	the	state	denounced	this	union.	The	
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people	felt	so	upset	at	the	Egyptian	domination	over	the	command	of	the	Ba’th	party	that	a	
military	coup	occurred	on	28	September	1961,	which	led	to	the	secession	of	Syria	from	
Egypt.	Still	unsatisfied	with	the	performance	of	the	Ba’th	party,	many	peasants	as	well	as	
intellects	considered	rejoining	Egypt	as	well	as	carrying	out	a	series	of	attempted	coups	in	
1962.	The	fifth	Ba’th	conference	in	Lebanon	“advocated	an	all-embracing	Arab	union	‘on	a	
new	basis	but	with	due	regard	to	the	mistakes	of	the	former	one’;	it	was	to	be	a	federative	
union	under	collective	leadership”	(Ben-Tzur).	This	new	Ba’th	party	was	recreated	four	
years	after	the	dissolution	and	in	less	than	a	year	it	had	regained	control	of	the	country	
through	a	military	coup	and	had	unidentified	itself	with	the	old	party	who	had	agreed	to	
the	union	with	Egypt.		
	 After	years	of	struggle	within	the	Ba’th	party	and	shifting	of	power,	a	new	ideology	
was	formed.	The	“theoretical	confusion	and	ideological	backwardness	in	the	party	was	felt	
even	more	keenly	in	view	of	the	ideological	developments	in	the	other	revolutionary	
regimes	of	the	Arab	world,	which	tended	to	emphasize	the	social	commitments	of	the	
national	revolution,	and	of	the	developments	in	the	communist	world	which	tended	to	
emphasize	the	national	character	of	the	tasks	along	the	route	to	socialism”	(Ben-Tzur).	The	
change	in	power	as	well	as	the	structural	and	ideological	framework	proposed	by	the	old	
party	leadership,	the	military	group,	the	regionalists	or	the	careerists,	were	never	
supported	in	a	unifying	manner	within	the	party.	What	then	formed	was	the	neo-Ba’th	
party	of	Syria	based	on	“scientific-socialist	ingredients	and	the	militancy	of	the	ideology”	
(Ben-Tzur).	This	ultimately	under	the	influence	and	creation	by	Al-Hafiz	became	known	as	
“Arab	Socialism”.	
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	 This	strong	Arab	party	poses	a	paradox	though,	as	a	poor	Alawite	man	took	over	
control	and	power.	Hafiz	al-Assad	came	from	one	of	the	previously	mentioned	poor	Alawi	
families	in	the	countryside.	The	paradox	that	is	presented	is	how	a	minority	group	and	man	
could	come	to	power	in	a	majority	and	Arab	political	party,	vastly	different	from	what	each	
other	believed.	To	understand,	it	is	worth	noting	and	analyzing	the	Alawi	group	in	detail.	
	 Alawism	was	made	into	a	separate	branch	of	religion	from	Shi’i	Islam.	Whereby	
Muslims	faithful	saying	is	“there	is	no	deity	but	God	and	Muhammad	is	His	prophet”,	Alawis	
believe	“There	is	not	deity	by	Ali,	no	veil	but	Muhammad,	and	no	bab	but	Salman”	(Pipes).	
The	Alawis	therefore	reject	Islam’s	main	tenets,	forcing	them	to	be	considered	non-
Muslims	(Pipes).	The	far	greatest	parallel	to	the	beliefs	and	traditions	of	the	Alawis	is	
Christianity.	For	these	reasons,	“many	observers-missionaries	especially-have	suspected	
the	Alawis	of	a	secret	Christian	proclivity”	(Pipes).	Though	women	in	the	Alawi	religion	are	
treated	“abominably”	they	experience	far	greater	freedom	than	the	veiled	Muslim	women	
(Pipes).	Alawis	do	in	fact	reject	Islam’s	sacred	law	of	Shari’a.	The	hate	of	the	Sunnis	stems	
from	the	strong	religious	diversions,	especially	in	the	sense	that	Sunnis	were	considered	
the	upper	class	of	Syria	and	the	Alawis	considered	of	the	lower	minority	similar	to	those	of	
Christianity.	Therefore,	“Alawis	do	not	act	like	Sunni	Muslims;	rather,	they	resemble	
Christians	and	Jews	in	pursuing	a	wholly	distinct	way	of	life”	(Pipes).	Given	that	the	
Alawites	are	whom	ultimately	take	control	of	the	government	and	power	through	Hafiz	al-
Asad,	it	is	reasonable	to	understand	that	the	change	in	socioeconomic	role	and	religious	
deviation	spur	the	Sunni	hatred	towards	the	minority	Alawites.	This	understanding	then	
begins	to	explain	the	paradox	between	the	rise	to	power	of	an	Alawite	through	a	pan-Arab	
party.	
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	 It	should	be	noted	that	since	the	French	Mandates,	the	Alawites	and	Sunnis	have	
cultivated	a	deep	internal	hate	for	one	another.	The	Alawites	benefited	from	the	mandate	
more	than	any	other	minority	group.	The	Alawites	“gained	political	autonomy	and	escaped	
Sunni	control”	(Fildis).	The	French	even	created	an	Alawite	state	known	as	the	“state	of	
Latakia”,	as	well	as	were	bestowed	legal	autonomy	from	the	French.	The	French	
strongholds	and	imperial	influence	in	Syria	did	not	stop	there	in	cultivating	this	deep	rift	
between	Sunnis	and	Alawites.	Another	“major	instrument	of	the	French	influence	on	the	
Alawites	was	their	recruitment	into	the	Troupes	Speciales	du	Levant,	a	local	military	force	
formed	in	1921	and	alter	developed	into	the	Syrian	and	Lebanese	armed	forces”	(Fildis).	
The	French	control	of	the	army	allowed	them	to	divide	the	troops	according	to	group	so	as	
to	maintain	a	low	level	of	each,	preventing	any	one	of	them	from	becoming	so	powerful	that	
they	could	oust	the	French	administration	and	presence	in	Syria.	The	French	hand	picked	
and	designed	the	Syrian	Army	along	strong	rural	and	minority	representation.	The	French	
considered	Alawites	a	reliable	and	trustworthy	minority	and	so	maintained	a	branch	
serving	under	to	local	French	officers.	The	purpose	of	the	French	army	in	aiming	to	pad	the	
military	with	rural	minorities	was	“because	they	were	far	from	urban-dominant	political	
ideology,	Arab	nationalism”	(Fildis).	They	further	attempted	to	weaken	the	Arab	Sunnis,	
the	one	group	capable	of	overturning	French	Syria.	It	is	clear	in	the	understanding	of	the	
French	influence	on	the	Syrian	army	that	an	increased	spark	of	distrust	was	implemented	
between	the	Sunnis	and	the	Alawites.	The	Alawites,	strongly	favored	by	the	French,	were	
given	far	more	opportunities	and	power	than	were	the	majority	Sunnis.	In	addition,	the	
French	use	of	mandates	and	imperial	invasion	took	control	over	the	Syrian	army,	molding	
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it	to	their	exact	standards	and	preferences	so	to	appease	those	they	supported	and	
minimize	the	presence	of	those	groups	they	disliked.	
	 Pan-Arabism	and	the	fundamental	beliefs	and	values	held	by	the	Ba’th	party	were	
far	from	relatable	to	the	Alawites.	As	was	previously	mentioned,	the	pan-Arab	view	was	
held	by	socially,	economically,	and	financially	well-established	Sunnis	in	Syria.	It	is	
interesting	therefore	that	the	people	would	elect	and	then	support	for	so	long	a	poor	
minority	Alawite	man,	religiously	believing	in	everything	nearly	opposite	that	of	those	in	
support	of	pan-Arabism.	This	continued	to	anger	many	Sunnis	pitting	them	further	against	
the	Alawite	peoples,	yet	the	continuity	that	Asad	put	in	place	and	the	relative	stability	that	
he	maintained	were	enough	to	earn	him	the	backing	of	even	those	Ba’th	party	members	
who	were	religiously	or	culturally	different	from	himself.	
	 Asad	was	the	first	leader	to	hold	onto	the	reins	of	power	in	Syria	for	an	extended	
period	of	time.	It	is	argued	that	Asad’s	regime	in	Syria	acts	in	a	system	of	three	interlocking	
orbits-	Alawi,	Syrian	and	Arab	(Zisser).	The	Alawi	orbit	would	be	the	internal	core;	the	
Syrian	orbit	would	be	the	outer	shell	and	the	Arab	orbit	would	be	its	soul	supporting	the	
authority	(Zisser).	The	Syrian	regime,	composed	of	these	pertinent	levels,	had	become	a	
personally	controlled	regime	through	the	succession	of	roles	within	the	Asad	family	and	
Asad’s	tribal	affiliations.	Asad	mirrored	his	regime	structure	and	functioning	to	that	of	the	
Soviet	Union	looking	up	to	communist	regime	rulers	like	Nicolae	Ceausescu	and	Kim	Il	
Sung.	Syria’s	regime	had	now	become	the	product	of	the	Alawi’s	rise	from	“humble	status	of	
a	minority	to	pre-eminence”	(Zisser).	Asad’s	regime	depended	on	the	sectarian	support	of	
the	Alawis.	Asad’s	regime	was	also	deeply	rooted	in	the	Syrian	component	that	stemmed	
from	the	Ba’ath	revolution	in	1963	and	the	neo-Ba’th	revolution	of	1966,	which	drove	
	
	
Baltes		
41	
home	the	resulting	socio-economic	and	political	order	of	Syria.	Alawi	dominance	and	the	
Asad	regime	grew	in	strength	and	support	at	the	time	as	the	other	minority	groups	
including	the	Christians,	Druze,	and	Ismaili	backed	it	in	an	effort	to	preserve	their	own	
security.	Asad	rules	as	a	dictator	appointing	people	closest	to	him	to	the	highest	most	
powerful	and	authoritative	positions.	Like	most	dictators,	he	does	what	needs	to	be	done	
first	and	foremost	to	maintain	his	leadership	role.	It	can	be	argued	that	the	two	strongholds	
that	not	only	placed	Asad	in	a	position	of	power	but	also	kept	him	there	are	his	military	
connection	with	the	army	and	the	Ba’th	party	which	attracted	members	of	prominent	social	
circles	(Zisser).	Overall,	the	large	minority	number	in	Syria,	as	long	as	they	remain	in	
support	of	Asad	and	his	regime,	any	sort	of	uprising	like	was	seen	with	the	Islamic	Revolt	of	
1976-82,	will	be	crushed.		
	 So	why	then,	despite	his	communist,	dictatorial,	oppressive	ways,	was	Asad	
successful?	One	answer	argues	that	he	gave	the	constituents	answers	to	some	degree	while	
giving	them	a	government	and	society	to	participate	and	belong	(Zisser).	Finally,	the	Arab	
orbit.	Though	Asad	was	young,	inexperienced,	and	lacked	confidence,	his	strong	ideological	
ties	to	Arabism	is	what	provided	him	and	his	regime	legitimacy	in	not	only	the	eyes	of	his	
fellow	Syrian	people,	but	the	international	arena	and	world	as	a	whole.	In	regards	to	his	
repressive	regime	success	and	ability	to	hold	onto	power	for	so	long	and	within	his	family,	
Asad	had	created	two	armies.	Of	the	two	armies,	“one	was	made	up	of	praetorian	guard	
units	recruited	from	his	kin	and	sect	that	defended	the	regime,	the	other	the	professional	
army	that	defended	the	country’s	borders”	(Hinnebusch).	Further	more,	Hafiz	al-Assad’s	
ability	to	create	further	legitimacy	in	his	regime	stemmed	from	his	ability	to	identify	what	
one	author	named	Dawish	pointed	out	as	party,	army,	bureaucracy,	secret	police	
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(Hinnebusch).	These	“pillars	of	power”	are	what	a	dominant	presidency	rested	on	and	
allowed	the	leader’s	subordination	of	and	balancing	above	these	institutions	as	a	solution	
to	instability	(Hinnebusch).	What	further	legitimized	the	Asad	regime	was	his	ability	to	
turn	Syria	from	a	losing	player	to	a	successful	player	in	the	disputes	with	Israel.	This	
change	in	growth	and	power	allowed	him	to	“promote	a	hegemonic	nationalist	discourse	
and	turn	Syria	into	a	key	regional	power	in	struggles”	(Hinnebusch).	
	 Asad’s	regime	can	be	viewed	as	having	two	main	components	structurally.	First	
there	was	the	formal	system	of	government.	This	side	included	an	executive	and	
legislature.	The	formal	structure	had	roots	in	the	Syrian	Constitution	and	the	Ba’th	party.	
Equally	as	important	is	the	informal	system	of	government	that	contains	“the	heads	of	the	
security	services	and	senior	military	commanders”	(Zisser).	This	side	of	the	governmental	
structure	is	expected	to	“ensure	stability	in	the	state	and	protect	it”	(Zisser).	The	party	and	
the	civilian	government	constitute	the	formal	structural	component	though	the	party	takes	
priority	in	society	and	politics.	The	head	of	the	party	is	known	as	the	Party’s	Secretary-
General	and	is	held	and	maintained	by	Hafiz	al-Asad.	The	Syrian	Elite	under	Asad	was	made	
up	of	people	from	his	own	family,	the	Alawi	barons,	and	member	of	the	Sunni	community	in	
support	of	his	future	state	(Zisser).	Although	there	is	a	strongly	personal	and	sectarian	
nature	to	the	Syrian	Regime	created	by	Asad,	he	has	gained	respect	and	support	within	the	
borders	of	Syrian	and	beyond	in	the	Middle	East	due	to	his	political	and	social	ability	to	
establish	a	functioning	state	and	then	maintain	it	far	longer	than	any	other	attempted	
leader	or	organization.		
	 Asad’s	legacy	and	regime	did	not	come	without	trials.	When	the	Soviet	Union	
appointed	a	new	General	Secretary,	Mikhail	Gorbachev,	Syria	saw	this	as	an	opportunity	to	
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increase	their	relations	and	friendship	with	the	communist	country.	In	the	meantime,	they	
had	their	sites	first	and	foremost	on	defeating	Israel.	They	were	also	dedicated	to	ridding	
the	Middle	East	of	Zionism	especially	in	Lebanon,		“an	Arab	rejectionist	front	against	the	
Israeli-Egyptian-American	axis	was	now	established”	(Zisser),	and	the	Islamic	Revolt	had	
been	squashed.	As	Syria’s	confidence	and	strength	grew,	they	began	to	invest	financially	in	
improving	their	military	and	weaponries.	The	spending	however,	was	not	limited.	They	
began	to	incur	large	debts	as	they	plunged	deeper	and	deeper	into	unnecessary	security	
purchases.	The	focus	on	security	caused	neglect	in	other	realms	of	Syrian	society	such	as	
health,	education,	and	waters	supply,	leading	to	a	failing	society	overall	(Zisser).	The	result	
of	these	poor	financial	expenditures;	an	economic	crisis	in	1985	that	in	turn	led	to	the	
beginning	of	anti-regime	sentiment	and	criticism	(Zisser).	Syria	grew	more	and	more	
erratic	leading	to	further	fallout	with	the	west,	specifically	the	United	States.	So	much	so	
that	the	United	States	refused	to	have	Asad	to	Washington	for	high-level	meetings	with	the	
President.	Syria	full	of	anti-American	sentiment	paired	with	the	American	support	of	Israel	
continued	to	create	a	rocky	path	between	the	two	polar	opposite	countries.	Asad	also	
played	a	direct	role	in	his	declining	position	of	power	within	the	regime	as	corruption	
became	apparent	and	brought	to	the	forefront.	It	I	argued	that	while	the	economy	and	his	
people	struggled	to	survive	financially	he	was	making	decisions	and	acting	in	ways	to	
improve	the	financial	positions	of	those	closest	to	him,	and	already	well-off.	This	
corruption	was	just	another	factor	inhibiting	the	growth	and	progression	of	Syrian	society	
and	government	
	
IX.	BASHAR	AL-ASAD’S	RISE	TO	POWER	 	
	
	
Baltes		
44	
Upon	Asad’s	death,	and	Basil’s,	Bashar	al-Asad	took	power	at	just	age	34.	He	was	
studying	to	be	an	eye	doctor	in	London	when	he	was	called	home	after	the	death	of	his	
brother	(McHugo).	In	his	inaugural	speech,	Bashar	not	only	praised	his	father	for	his	
achievements,	but	he	also	criticized	failed	Syrian	institutions	and	government	policy	
(McHugo).	Furthermore	he	touched	on	the	popular	topic	of	regaining	the	Golan	Heights	in	
exchange	for	peace	with	Israel.	He	called	for	less	corruption,	more	transparency.	
Surprisingly,	and	important	in	later	understanding,	Bashar	discussed	democracy.	He	spoke	
about	it	with	reverence	and	respect	with	the	possibility	of	a	similar	goal	for	Syria.	Though	
he	acknowledge	what	a	difficult	task	this	would	be,	using	time	and	talk	as	a	possible	excuse	
should	the	people	not	support	democratic	reforms.	The	Damascus	Spring	came	out	of	these	
discussions	but	was	quickly	crushed	with	great	opposition	and	a	fear	of	the	loss	of	power	
for	Bashar.	It	did	not	take	long	for	word	to	spread	that	the	political	freedom	of	the	
Damascus	Spring	was	actually	just	“a	public	relations	exercise	by	the	authorities	and	little	
more”	(McHugo).	
The	rise	to	power	by	Bashar	al-Asad	was	a	succession	many	Syrians	feared	could	
overthrow	their	newly	found	stability	under	Hafiz,	once	he	passed.	It	was	unknown	
whether	“opposition	would	mobilize	once	the	feared	strongman	departed	or	the	regime	
even	disintegrate	in	internecine	struggle”	(Hinnebusch).	However,	the	transfer	of	power	
was	rather	smooth	and	successful.	This	could	potentially	be	attributed	to	the	fact	that	
Bashar	represented	to	the	people’s	desire	for	both	continuity	and	change	through	his	
ability	to	continue	what	his	father	had	started	and	done	while	still	being	considered	a	
modernizer,	helping	him	earn	support	from	the	younger	generations.	It	may	appear	to	the	
outside	eye	that	this	is	a	reflection	of	the	successful	institutions	that	had	been	instilled	in	
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the	once	unstable	country,	but	according	to	author	Lesch,	it	shows	rather	that	“the	elites	
came	together	in	a	consensus”	(Hinnebusch).	Within	three	years	of	coming	to	power	
Bashar	had	reinvented	to	political	elite,	“with	a	turnover	of	60%	in	top	offices,	via	
retirement,	thereby	transferring	power	to	a	new	generation”	(Hinnebusch).	Perhaps	part	of	
Bashar	al-Asad’s	crumble	from	power	in	the	eyes	of	the	people	began	when	he	began	to	
move	his	ideologies	and	reforms	away	from	Ba’thist	views	and	chose	a	more	liberalizing	
strategy.	However,	while	he	made	this	risky	modification,	he	had	no	plan	or	preparation	
with	where	he	would	go	with	it	and	therefore	had	to	make	sure	his	changes	were	gradual,	
avoiding	any	sort	of	backlash	and	instability.	Politically,	Perthes	argues	that	“Bashar’s	
project	can	be	understood	as	‘modernizing	authoritarianism’,	making	the	system	work	
better	so	that	it	could	survive	and	deliver	development”	(Hinnebusch).	Bashar	made	the	
acknowledgement	that	the	Syrian	society	was	not	in	a	place	to	instill	a	western	democracy.	
His	goals	were	first	and	foremost	aimed	at	social	and	economic	modernization	and	then	
followed	with	democratization.		
	 To	understand	the	role	that	Bashar	al-Asad	was	placed	in,	one	must	reflect	on	the	
major	historical	events	that	have	led	to	this	point.	The	British	and	French	partitioning	of	
Syria,	acquisition	of	complete	Syrian	independence,	unity	and	fallout	with	Egypt,	constant	
battle	and	turmoil	with	Israel	as	a	result	of	the	partitioning	of	Palestine,	all	of	these	factors	
on	top	of	his	own	father’s	imprint	on	Syria	(both	good	and	bad),	are	components	of	the	
society	and	culture	with	which	Bashar	has	authoritatively	inherited.	What	he	can	do	with	
that	will	not	only	be	a	challenge	but	a	test.		
	 On	September	11,	2001	Osama	bin	Laden’s	terrorist	suicide	team	crashed	airliners	
into	the	U.S.	World	Trade	Centers.	This	marked	further	Middle	Eastern	involvement	by	the	
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U.S.	in	a	more	direct	way	than	ever	before	as	President	Bush	declared	“war	on	terror”.	The	
terrorist	group	that	had	carried	out	the	attacks	was	known	as	Islamist	militants	of	al-Qaida.	
Syria	saw	this	as	an	opportunity	to	amend	relations	with	the	western	country	and	so	used	
their	intelligence	services	to	provide	information	to	the	American	government.	However,	
Syria	could	not	definitively	commit	to	being	“with”	the	United	States	in	their	Middle	
Eastern	battles	(McHugo).	Syria	opposed	the	U.S.	invasion	of	Iraq	in	2003	because	Iraq	was	
a	main	source	of	income	for	the	country.	While	other	countries	decreased	their	trade	and	
relations	with	Iraq	per	support	of	the	U.S.	Syria	failed	to	do	so	(McHugo).	As	American	
troops	began	to	line	the	borders	of	Syria,	and	Damascus	became	a	center	for	fleeing	
citizens,	Syria	began	to	question	if	they	were	next	on	the	American	radar.	Syria	made	the	
poor	decision	of	allowing	terrorist	infiltration	across	its	borders,	leading	the	U.S.	to	identify	
them	as	terrorist	sponsors,	and	ultimately	further	damaging	what	little	progress	had	been	
made	between	the	two.	In	addition,	it	was	as	if	Syria	saw	their	relations	with	the	west	and	
the	U.S.	as	irredeemable	because	they	chose	to	align	themselves	and	ally	with	the	terrorist	
group	Hezbollah.	Hezbollah	incessantly	attacked	Israel	further	creating	a	disparity	between	
the	pro-Arab	country	of	Syria	and	the	pro-western	country	of	America.	What	little	glimpse	
of	possible	positive	change	in	Syrian	government	was	felt	in	Bashar’s	inaugural	speech	was	
now	wiped	clean,	as	it	was	clear	he	would	follow	in	his	father’s	footsteps.	As	he	became	
more	corrupt	by	power	and	wealth,	though	he	had	many	followers	and	supporters	of	
various	sects	throughout	the	country,	Bashar	was	rapidly	increasing	the	gap	between	the	
wealthy	and	the	poor	(McHugo).	When	Bashar	al-Asad’s	economic	reforms	began	to	
dwindle	and	become	less	successful,	he	looked	elsewhere	to	continue	the	legitimization	of	
his	regime	and	“adopted	a	hard	line	toward	Israel	amidst	the	al-Aqsa	intifadah	and	opposed	
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the	U.S.	invasion	of	Iraq;	this,	in	arousing	intense	American	hostility,	soured	the	
international	environment	for	his	economic	reforms”	(Hinnebusch).	The	Damascus	Spring,	
a	liberalization	measure	that	was	seen	as	positive	in	regards	to	Bashar’s	regime,	were	then	
tarnished	when	he	“reasserted	the	authority	of	the	old	regime,	including	a	crackdown	in	
2001	on	political	discussion	groups	and	the	imprisonment	of	prodemocracy	militants”	(St	
John).	Bashar	al-Asad	had	quickly	begun	to	lose	support	and	was	now	spiraling	downward.	
He	continued	to	nose	dive	as	he	opened	to	Iraq,	and	supported	the	Palestinian	intifada	as	
was	previously	mentioned.	Furthermore,	his	inability	to	make	peace	with	Israel	prevents	
Syria	from	forming	a	positive	relationship	between	Syria	and	the	United	States.	In	the	
process,	“the	Israeli-Palestinian	conflict,	U.S.	occupation	of	Iraq,	and	concerns	that	the	war	
on	terrorism	could	target	Syria	all	reinforce	the	intransigence	of	the	old	guard	in	Syrian	
politics	and	become	a	pretext	for	obstructing	change	in	both	external	and	internal	policies”	
(St	John).	As	the	citizen’s	discontent	grew	over	the	lack	of	change,	a	major	movement	in	the	
Middle	East	sparked	the	first	outcry	to	be	heard	and	demand	change.	Bashar	al-Asad	
believed	Syria	was	too	stable	to	have	an	uprising	under	his	watch	and	control,	perhaps	that	
is	why	he	responded	with	such	brutality	when	the	Arab	Spring	spread	to	Syria.	
	
X.	THE	ARAB	SPRING	
The	Arab	Spring	was	a	democratic	uprising	that	started	in	Tunisia	and	spread	
among	a	group	of	Middle	Eastern	countries.	The	Arab	Spring	was	a	result	of	frustration	and	
failure	throughout	the	Middle	East.	The	Arab	Spring	was	born	out	of	a	“broad	set	of	ideas	
and	grievances	that	are	motivating”	change	(Jones).	As	Jones	states,	“the	Arab	world	
underperforms	all	other	regions	of	the	world	on	virtually	all	social,	political,	and	economic	
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indices,	and	has	done	for	many	years”	(Jones).	Jones	then	identified	three	important	factors	
that	would	increase	the	likelihood	of	the	Arab	Spring	spreading	to	specific	countries	and	
destabilizing	them.	Jones	identifies	these	three	factors	as	poverty,	lack	of	economic	
opportunity,	and	a	repressive	and	disliked	regime.	Chillingly,	these	three	things	throughout	
this	paper	have	all	been	proven	to	be	present	in	Syria.	In	addition,	the	technological	and	
social	innovations	fo	modern	times	has	given	the	“underemployed,	educated,	and	
frustrated	urban	youth	the	ability	to	communicate	in	real	time	and	to	organize	themselves	
via	social	media,	revolutionalizing	the	collective	imagination	of	what	is	possible”	(Jones).	
Ultimately,	one	of	the	main	factors	of	the	Arab	Spring	and	general	instability	in	the	Middle	
East	as	a	whole,	and	Syria	specifically,	comes	from	the	inability	for	leaders	and	regimes	to	
establish	legitimacy.	
Author	McHugo	states	that	“what	they	wanted	was	human	rights,	democracy	and	
jobs:	three	demands	which	they	summed	up	with	the	one	word	‘dignity’”	(McHugo).	The	
Arab	Spring	first	spread	to	places	like	Egypt,	Libya,	Bahrain,	and	Yemen	before	finally	
reaching	Syria.	This	outbreak	of	democratic	cries	was	the	event	that	finally	broke	Syria	into	
a	civil	war,	something	it	had	been	on	the	verge	of	for	nearly	its	whole	history.	Perhaps	it	
can	be	argued	that	it	was	avoidable	had	violence	not	been	seen	as	the	solution	by	the	
regime.	Unfortunately,	this	is	not	the	case,	and	it	was	rather	inevitable.	It	all	started	in	Syria	
in	a	southern	town	called	Der’a	where	a	group	of	young	school	children	had	begun	writing	
“freedom”	and	a	slogan	calling	for	the	fall	of	the	regime,	as	graffiti	on	their	school	walls.	
This	most	likely	came	from	influence	both	within	their	own	households	of	hearing	their	
parent’s	voiced	opinions	as	well	as	in	society	and	the	media	learning	about	the	other	Arab	
countries	who	had	carried	out	similar	events.	The	children,	ranging	in	age	from	9-15,	were	
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arrested	and	taken	to	Damascus	for	interrogation	and	torture	(McHugo).	After	pleas	for	
release	by	the	families	were	ignored,	demonstration	broke	out	calling	for	the	children’s	
release	in	Der’a.	The	security	forces	showed	their	insensitivity	to	brutality	when	they	shot	
four	people	dead	at	these	demonstrations.	This	only	fueled	the	demonstrators	and	the	
people	of	Syria,	increasing	the	protestor	turnout.	Dar’a’s	involvement	quickly	became	“a	
rallying	cry	across	the	country	for	what	began	as	a	rural	and	provincial	driven	uprising”	
(CNN).		The	protestors	began	attacking	government	offices	and	buildings	and	the	security	
forces	began	attacking	hospitals	and	innocents’	as	well	as	local	Ba’th	party	headquarters.	
On	23	March,	the	security	forces	raided	a	mosque	which	had	become	a	temporary	hospital	
to	treat	those	now	being	injured	in	the	ongoing	disturbances	and	on	this	day,	15	people	
were	reported	killed	and	hundreds	injured	(McHugo).	In	an	attempt	to	preserve	his	
authority	and	power,	Bashar	blamed	it	all	on	a	foreign	conspiracy	(McHugo).	He	further	
claimed	that	“stability	in	Syria	depended	on	its	[his	regime]	staying	in	power”	(Olmert).	Yet,	
the	government	brutality	against	protestors	did	not	let	up	and	the	battle	between	Syrian	
citizens	and	the	Syrian	government	had	escalated	into	all	out	chaos	and	civil	war.	It	quickly	
spiraled	into	a	more	sectarian	battle	as	it	became	evident	that	Bashar	al-Asad’s	regime,	
Alawite,	had	committed	the	atrocious	massacres.		
	
XI.	ANALYSIS	RESULTS	
Today	it	is	highly	debated	what	has	led	to	the	gruesome	outbreak	of	violence	and	
civil	war	in	the	Middle	East	as	a	whole	and	Syria	specifically.	One	country	believes	and	
argues	it	is	the	colonial	and	imperial	mock	rule	that	took	place	by	western	states	
historically.	As	a	result	Syria	has	never	been	able	to	rid	itself	of	hostile	feelings	from	
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unwanted	intervention.	Others	argue	that	it	is	a	result	of	the	bad	blood	from	the	Six	Days	
War	between	Syria	and	Israel	because	Israel	was	ultimately	a	“friend”	of	the	U.S,	increasing	
anti-western	views	in	an	already	strongly	pro-Arab	region	and	country.	The	most	popularly	
argued	reason	for	the	Syrian	struggles	and	war	are	the	sectarian	differences	and	vast	
variety	of	differing	groups.	The	latter	is	the	most	common	choice	of	blame	from	the	United	
States.	Yet	still	the	argument	stems	to	socioeconomic	divergence.	
	 What	these	western	and	European	countries	on	the	outside	looking	in	often	
misunderstand,	is	that	the	Syrian	Civil	War	is	not	the	result	of	one	pointed	finger.	Meaning,	
the	Syria	we	see	and	experience	today	is	a	Syria	shaped	and	molded	by	all	of	these	
influences	and	factors	deeply	rooted	in	historical	significance.	The	French	Mandates,	
French	and	British	intervention,	Israeli-Syrian	War,	Syrian-Egyptian	unity,	and	sectarian	
divides	all	play	a	role	in	the	instability	in	both	Syrian	society	and	government.	They	have	
built	on	top	of	each	other,	one	influencing	the	other,	intertwining	themselves	as	intricately	
as	the	history	they	reside	in.	The	inability	of	a	leader	or	group	to	maintain	power	and	
create	an	environment	suitable	for	progression	has	led	to	short-lived	terms	of	power	and	
extensive	handoffs	of	authority	between	many	different	people.	These	components	laid	the	
groundwork	for	what	is	more	modernly	the	Asad	Regime.	A	leader	who	provided	some	
degree	of	continuity	for	a	period	of	time	could	be	considered	the	most	successful	Syrian	
ruler,	securing	the	position	of	power	to	remain	in	his	family.	As	successors	have	risen	up,	
they	inevitably	follow	suit	in	their	ideologies	and	political	policies,	leading	them	to	never	
quite	impact	Syria	positively	on	a	long-term	scale,	nor	make	the	changes	or	differences	
necessary	to	society	and	government	as	a	whole.		
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The	Asad	Regime	was	merely	a	sheet	of	hope	cast	over	a	land	of	deeply	rooted,	
extensive	issues.	These	issues	have	never	truly	been	addressed	in	a	legitimate	way	of	
finding	a	solution,	rather	a	façade	to	alleviate	the	here	and	now.	Literature	emphasizes	the	
goals	of	most	leaders,	especially	those	based	on	dictatorial	ideologies,	tend	to	have	one	goal	
on	their	mind;	power.	More	importantly,	their	one	goal	is	maintaining	that	power.	The	Asad	
family	is	no	different.	They	have	done	what	they	can	and	want	to	insure	their	roles,	
finances,	and	power	never	escape	their	grasp.	As	a	result,	the	underlying	historical	tensions	
have	always	managed	to	find	a	way	to	rise	back	up,	sending	Syria	spiraling	back	down	into	
its	quick	sand	of	a	broken	societal	system.	The	civil	war,	is	not	only	product	of	these	
unsolved	broken	linkages,	but	is	also	the	current	state	of	failure	we	are	experiencing	in	
modern	Syria	today.	
	 Syria’s	strength	in	ideology	contributes	to	a	level	of	stubbornness	in	fixing	its	issues.	
Unfortunately	the	image	of	outside	help	has	been	so	tainted	by	past	interactions	that	Syria	
will	not	even	consider	the	idea	of	peaceful	intervention	by	another	state.	The	first	topic	that	
should	be	addressed	is	Syria	and	its	international	relations.	Upon	improvement	in	this	
realm,	Syria	could	potentially	be	more	open	to	assistance	and	aid	from	the	countries	it	so	
deeply	loathes,	but	could	help.	For	example	mending	their	relationship	with	the	United	
States	would	not	only	help	this	direct	relationship	but	would	also	require	the	coming	to	a	
joint	agreement	on	the	topic	of	Israel,	thereby	finding	a	solution	to	two	prominent	
impactful	events	that	had	once	shaped	them	in	negative	ways,	potentially	paving	the	way	
for	a	now	positive	outcome.	Support	from	a	country	like	the	U.S.	would	allow	Syria	to	
receive	foreign	aid,	but	would	also	improve	their	overall	image	internationally.	The	United	
States	is	trusted	and	well-liked	as	are	their	friends	and	allies.	Many	countries	right	now	
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fear	attaching	themselves	in	anyway	to	Syria	so	some	sort	of	peaceful	negotiations	and	
approvals	could	immediately	improve	their	situation.	
	Though	history	can	never	be	forgotten,	and	should	never	be	forgotten,	Syria’s	best	
interests	lie	in	a	third-party	intervention.	Starting	there,	getting	the	country	on	its	feet,	and	
mentoring	them	to	a	place	promoting	progression	is	a	strong	and	aggressive	way	to	
“attack”	the	issues	in	Syria.	As	long	as	they	continue	to	rage	on,	the	problems	grow	and	
begin	to	spread	beyond	the	borders	of	this	Middle	Eastern	country	as	was	previously	
mentioned	as	a	consequence	in	many	aspects.	Outside	assistance	may	also	be	able	to	
implement	a	more	successful	and	flourishing	economic	program.	As	another	one	of	the	
downfalls	in	Syria,	the	wealthy	to	poor	economic	gap	(and	growing),	stabilizing	the	
economy	through	means	other	than	a	socialist	system,	as	was	had	in	the	past,	would	mean	
decreasing	this	disparity.	However	this	tactic	presents	a	challenge	of	its	own.	Syria	has	
alluded	to	“involving	Israel	in	a	full-scaled	war	if	attacked	either	by	the	United	States,	
NATP,	or	Turkey”	(Olmert).	Incapable	of	attacking	Israel	in	an	impactful	way,	it	is	more	the	
Syrian	ally	Hezbollah,	and	the	means	to	attain	chemical	warheads,	that	the	U.S.	is	skeptical	
about	upsetting.	
	
XII.	CONSEQUENCES	
The	impact	of	the	Syrian	civil	war	has	been	widespread.	It	has	shaken	the	state	of	
Lebanon,	a	religiously	diverse	nation	that	is	on	the	brink	of	its	own	imbalance	in	its	
sectarian	divisions	as	well	as	those	who	support	and	oppose	President	Bashar	al-Asad.	
Much	of	this	stems	from	the	bordering	country	and	Syria	and	its	civil	war,	offshooting	and	
effecting	countries	like	Lebanon.	To	many	researchers	surprise	though,	the	effects	it	has	
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had	on	Lebanon	are	less	negative	than	other	surrounding	countries.	The	merchandise	
imports	and	exports	as	well	as	service	exports	had	remained	rather	stable	during	the	civil	
war.	The	loss	of	Syrian	goods	to	compete	in	the	market	has	opened	further	avenues	for	
Lebanon	to	take	advantage	of	and	financially	boost	their	own	economy.		
Stemming	from	the	economic	impact	is	the	question	of	regional	resources	such	as	
oil.	Simply,	prices	will	fluctuate	due	to	uncertainty,	but	is	that	all?	Regional	unrest	and	
major	events,	such	as	the	Arab	Spring,	could	potentially	cause	oil	prices	to	skyrocket.	While	
the	Gulf	States	tend	to	be	more	stable	and	can	work	to	stabilize	oil	prices	long	term,	there	is	
still	the	possibility	of	sporadic	short	term	sharp	increases	in	the	price	of	oil	as	the	Middle	
East	is	the	oil	capital	of	the	world.		
Another	consequence	of	the	Syrian	civil	war	is	the	economic	downturn	of	Syria.	
Syria,	not	the	strongest	trading	nation	in	the	Middle	East,	has	created	such	bad	blood	
between	not	only	themselves	but	also	fellow	Middle	Eastern	countries	and	especially	
western	countries.	This	has	caused	many	nations	to	restrict	trade	with	Syria	or	cut	trade	
ties	off	altogether.	In	terms	of	domestic	economy	the	civil	war	has	destroyed	infrastructure,	
prevented	children	from	going	to	school,	closed	factories,	and	deterred	overall	investments	
and	trade	(Cal).	Citizens	are	facing	high	levels	of	unemployment	at	57	percent,	while	in	
2013	Syria’s	GDP	dropped	a	staggering	20.6	percent,	and	in	2014	the	economy	was	so	
disrupted	no	formula	could	even	produce	accurate	statistics	(Global	Envision).	According	
to	the	European	Council	on	Foreign	Relations,	the	Syrian	HDI	has	fallen	back	to	where	it	
was	38	years	ago,	meaning	that	today	the	average	Syrian	has	the	same	life	expectancy,	
education	and	employment	prospects	as	in	1977	(Global	Envision).	In	a	look	at	the	future,	if	
	
	
Baltes		
54	
the	war	were	to	end,	the	United	Nations	anticipates	the	damage	will	be	similar	to	some	
nations	after	WWII,	taking	40-50	years	to	fully	recover	(Global	Envision).	
Syrian	expert	Josef	Olmert	also	emphasizes	the	demographic	changes,	which	are	to	
be	expected	as	a	consequence	of	the	Syrian	civil	war.	In	Lebanon,	“their	civil	war	and	
aftermath	brought	about	two	very	distinct	changes,	the	first	was	the	dramatic	weakening	of	
the	Christian	population	of	the	country,	mostly	the	Maronites,	but	also	other	Christian	
sects,	and	the	second,	was	the	brain	drain,	as	many	who	left	belonged	to	the	more	educated	
and	skilled	elements	of	the	population”	(Olmert).	He	goes	on	to	further	claim	this	can	be	the	
demographic	outcome	we	should	expect	to,	sadly,	see	in	Syria.	The	violence	in	Syria	has	
also	shifted	towards	an	ethno-sectarian	battle,	which	has	prompted,	the	Kurdish	
community	to	mobilize	to	protect	itself	(Lawson).	The	“ethno-sectarianization	of	the	civil	
war,	along	with	the	political	mobilization	of	almost	all	of	Syria’s	minority	communities,	has	
prompted	members	of	these	ethnic	and	religious	minorities	who	reside	in	neighboring	
countries	to	intervene	directly	in	the	conflict”	(Lawson).	The	greatest	of	these	types	of	
involvement	came	through	the	Lebanese	Shi’I	movement	the	Party	of	God,	known	more	
typically	as	Hezbollah.	This	is	where	we	begin	to	see	the	most	tragic	consequence	of	the	
Syrian	civil	war,	refugee	movements.	Much	of	the	refugee	movement	has	dramatically	
increased	in	numbers	recently,	as	the	instability	that	has	been	further	perpetuated	by	the	
civil	war	has	opened	the	door	for	terrorists	to	locate	and	create	a	stronghold	in	the	country.	
One	of	these	terrorist	organizations	whom	are	active	in	Syria	is	ISIS.	
One	of	the	most	tragic	consequences	is	the	refugee	movement	from	Syria	to	nearby	
Middle	Eastern	countries	in	an	effort	to	attain	peace,	security,	and	an	overall	better	quality	
of	life.	What	was	once	less	than	58,000	“asylum	seekers”	in	April	of	2015	has	dramatically	
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risen	to	close	to	89,000	in	June	(Heisbourg).	In	June	there	was	nearly	190,000	Syrian	
refugees.	From	January	to	September	2015,	75%	of	refugees	were	seeking	shelter	in	Greece	
from	Turkey	(Heisbourg)	and	70%	of	these	were	nearly	all	Syrian.	This	mass	exodus	of	
people	has	consequences	however,	for	the	countries	that	are	a	part	of	the	EU	they	are	
arriving	in.	Not	only	does	it	create	tensions,	overcrowding,	loss	of	jobs	for	current	citizens,	
and	drain	finances	to	sustain	the	abruptly	spiked	population	numbers	etc.	But	it	also	brings	
a	security	dynamic	to	play,	especially	as	it	becomes	more	evident	that	these	refugee	groups	
are	now	being	infiltrated	by	terrorist	groups	such	as	ISIS,	seeking	to	use	them	as	a	tactic	to	
employ	terrorist	activity	in	the	open	countries.	Overall	the	ability	to	house	and	protect	the	
displaced	migrants	in	the	new	countries	is	straining	these	countries	because	of	limited	
numbers	of	resources.	This	displacement	is	“causing	an	enormous	humanitarian	crisis	with	
implications	for	host	countries,	international	aid	agencies,	and,	of	course,	for	those	whose	
lives	have	been	forever	changed”	(Kirisci	&	Ferris).	The	civil	war	in	Syria	has	also	had	the	
effect	of	forcing	neighboring	countries’	leaders	in	the	Middle	East	to	either	back	Bashar	al-
Asad	or	the	Syrian	opposition,	what	they	choose	can	potentially	have	to	power	to	create	
more	instability	and	international	hostility	in	an	already	fragile	region.		
The	continued	violence	and	civil	war	in	Syria,	which	appears	to	have	no	imminent	
end,	provides	“no	prospect	for	their	early	return	home”	(Heisbourg).	As	refugees	are	
increasing,	more	and	more	countries	are	also	choosing	to	close	their	doors	for	a	multitude	
of	various	reasons.	It	was	stated	by	Slovakian	leader	Jaroslaw	Kaczynski	that,	“In	Slovakia,	
we	don’t	have	mosques,	we	only	want	to	choose	the	Christians”	(Heisbourg).	Many	regional	
concerns	have	shifted	in	just	a	few	short	years.	One	main	regional	concern	regarding	the	
Syrian	civil	war	outbreak	would	be	to	“avoid	large-scale	refugee	flows”	(Heisbourg).	A	
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second	important	topic	worth	addressing	to	many	regional	countries	would	be	the	
elimination	of	ISIS	as	well	as	providing	the	non-Jihadi	component	of	the	Syrian	rebellion	
with	the	ability	to	resist	Russian	and	Iranian	operations	in	support	of	Asad	while	still	
pursuing	his	removal	through	political	measures	(Heisbourg).	Most	literature	on	the	topic	
of	refugee	movements	asserts	it	as	a	consequence	of	civil	war.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	it	
has	also	been	argued	to	be	a	possible	cause	of	civil	war.	One	article	on	international	
organizations	notes,	“that	international	migration	in	general,	and	refugee	migration	in	
particular,	can	have	important	security	consequences,	which	suggests	that	refugee	flows	
and	population	movements	can	spur	the	spread	of	conflict	both	between	and	within	state”	
(Salehyan	&	Gleditsch).		
	
XIII.	CONCLUSION	
It	is	easy	to	fall	victim	to	the	belief	that	the	solution	to	the	Syrian	Civil	War	is	simple	
and	straightforward.	It	is	easy	to	believe	fixing	one	minor	detail	will	put	the	country	as	a	
whole	back	on	its	feet.	The	Syrian	Civil	War	is	a	result	of	more	than	just	corruption	and	
sectarian	division	as	is	most	regularly	depicted	in	western	politics.	It	is	the	product	of	a	
long	line	of	historical	events	that	started	by	implanting	a	seed,	and	continued	to	grow	on	
each	other,	each	one	stirring	up	bad	feelings.	The	Syrian	Civil	War	is	an	outbreak	of	internal	
violence	based	on	the	historical	events	of	French	and	British	colonial	rule,	French	
mandates,	Israeli-Syrian	war,	Egyptian	and	Syrian	unification,	sectarian	divisions,	and	the	
Asad	Regime.	All	of	these	factors	created	an	environment	of	political	distrust,	instability,	
turmoil,	chaos,	and	ultimately	violence	as	we	now	see	today.	More	simply	put,	it	is	the	
product	of	a	conglomerate	of	historical	imperfections.	Although	there	are	many	
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consequences	of	the	civil	war,	some	that	have	yet	to	even	occur,	one	of	the	most	tragic	is	
the	refugee	movement	the	world	is	experiencing	today.	Now	raised	as	a	moral,	ethical,	and	
civil	issue,	the	refugee	movement	has	become	a	source	of	great	debate	and	discomfort	in	
the	international	arena.	The	question	of	what	is	right	and	what	is	wrong	is	at	the	forefront	
as	many	countries	intervene	to	do	what	they	can,	but	even	more	stay	quiet	in	avoidance.	As	
the	world	continues	to	search	for	a	solution,	I	believe	the	answer	lies	in	the	understanding	
that	the	civil	war	is	the	result	of	not	just	one	individual	event,	as	is	often	argued	
internationally,	but	rather	a	conglomerate	of	deeply	intertwined	historical	moments.	
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